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1Introduction
Government policy rather than market forces shaped the development and operation
of scheduled passenger air service in almost all markets for the ﬁrst six decades of the
airline industry’s history. Government intervention in commercial aviation coincided with
the industry’s inception in the aftermath of World War I, with many governments keenly
cognizant of the potential military beneﬁts of a robust domestic aviation sector. During
these early days, interest in aviation outpaced the ﬁnancial viability of ﬂedging airlines.
Government support intensiﬁed worldwide as ﬁnancial instability was exacerbated by the
global economic depression in the 1930s and military interest in aviation was fortiﬁed by
increasing geopolitical tensions. Relatively low entry barriers, combined with the lure of
government subsidies, led to many small providers of passenger air transportation, and to
concern over fragmentation and “destructive competition.”
Pressure to rationalize the industry and promote the development of strong national
air carriers became manifest in subsidies and regulation of privately-owned ﬁrms in the
U.S., and in state ownership nearly everywhere else. In the U.S., Post Oﬃce control
through airmail contract awards ultimately gave way to direct economic regulation of
prices and entry by an independent regulatory agency in 1938, though both direct and
indirect subsidies through airmail rates continued as part of that regulation.1 In Europe,
state subsidies quickly evolved into consolidation and state ownership of domestic “ﬂag”
carriers. Restrictions on foreign ownership of domestic air carriers were universal.
International service was governed by tightly controlled bilateral agreements, which
speciﬁed the cities that could be served and which carriers were authorized to provide
service, typically a single carrier from each country. In many cases, these agreements ne-
gotiated market allocations across carriers that were enforced through capacity restrictions
or revenue division agreements. Prices generally were established jointly by the airlines
themselves, under the auspices of the International Air Transport Association (IATA),
subject to approval by each carrier’s government.
The transition to a more market-based aviation industry began in the U.S. in the
mid-1970s. Enactment of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 eliminated price and en-
try regulation of the domestic airline industry and provided for ultimate closure of its
regulatory agency, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB). Subsequent privatization eﬀorts
2elsewhere have transferred many carriers from state-owned enterprises to the private sec-
tor, though the U.S. and most other countries continue to claim a national interest in
domestic ownership of airlines operating within their borders. While there has been relax-
ation of regulation in some international markets, restrictive bilateral agreements continue
to limit competition in most markets and most nations continue to limit foreign ownership
of domestic airlines. The notable exceptions are within the European Union (EU), where
formal restraints on commercial aviation have been liberalized considerably over the past
15 years with the creation of an open intra-EU aviation market, and a limited number
of “open skies” agreements.2 Apart from the EU market, however, carriers continue to
be prohibited from competing for passengers on ﬂights entirely within another country
(so-called “cabotage” rights).
In this chapter, we analyze government regulation and deregulation primarily in the
context of U.S. domestic airline markets. This choice is dictated by three considerations.
First, intervention in passenger aviation took place through an explicit formal regulatory
system in the U.S., rather than through the more opaque operation of state-owned enter-
prise as elsewhere. Focusing on the U.S. enables a clearer discussion of government policies,
their changes, and eﬀects. From the inception of air travel, the United States has led the
world in incorporating market incentives into its airline policies. While nearly every other
country operated one or two state-owned airlines that dominated service, the U.S. relied on
privately-owned carriers and even under regulation allowed the airlines substantial auton-
omy in their operations. Second, until the E.U. changes in the late 1990s, policy reform has
taken place primarily within domestic aviation markets. As the U.S. has had the largest
domestic passenger aviation market in the world, it provides a substantial “laboratory”
for observing the eﬀects of policy changes. The U.S. also was the ﬁrst to deregulate air-
line pricing and entry, leading nearly all other countries by more than a decade, thereby
providing a longer post-reform period in which to study the transition across regimes.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the U.S. government has collected and published
detailed ﬁnancial, operational, and market data at the individual carrier, and in many
cases, carrier-route, level from the regulated era and continuing through to the present.
These unique data resources facilitate detailed econometric analyses that typically cannot
be duplicated with the data that are publicly available on airlines in other countries. The
availability of these data over much of the past 30 or more years has facilitated a wealth
3of analysis of regulatory reform and its impact.3
In this chapter, we ﬁrst describe brieﬂy the inception, institutions, and operation of
U.S. airline regulation. We then turn to a discussion of the events leading to deregulation
of the industry and evaluate the impact of those reforms. A brief discussion of interna-
tional aviation regulation and reform follows. Finally, we study the key issues of ongoing
contention in the industry and assesses their implications for the continuing debate over
government intervention in passenger aviation markets.
I. Airline Regulation
The United States federal government began using private air carriers to supplement
military airmail carriage in 1918, with early payloads devoted primarily to mail, not pas-
sengers. The Kelly Air Mail Act of 1925 (43 Stat. 805 (1925)) established a competitive
bidding system for private air mail carriage and subsequent amendments provided explicit
subsidies by enabling the Post Oﬃce to award contracts with payments exceeding antici-
pated air mail revenues on the routes.4 These subsidies, along with Ford Motor Company’s
introduction of a 12-seat aircraft in 1926, facilitated the expansion of passenger air ser-
vice in the nascent U.S. air carrier industry. By the 1930s, reports of the Postmaster
General’s eﬀorts to “rationalize” the route system and encourage the “coordination” of
vertically-integrated, national ﬁrms in the bidding process led to Congressional censure
and 1934 legislation to establish regulatory oversight by the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission (ICC). This was soon replaced by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, in which the
industry succeeded in establishing a system of protective economic regulation under what
eventually became the Civil Aeronautics Board and operational and safety oversight under
what was to become the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).5 Our analysis focuses
on economic regulation and deregulation.6 FAA operational and safety functions have not
been deregulated, and there is little evidence of signiﬁcant interactions between economic
and safety regulation in this setting (See Rose (1990, 1992), Kanafani et al. (1993), and
the citations therein).
As in many other industries during the Great Depression, airline policymakers and
executives alike were eager to trade the “chaos” of market determination of pricing and
network conﬁguration for government “coordination” across air carriers, elimination of
4“unfair or destructive competitive practices, ” and restriction of entry to that required by
the “public convenience and necessity.”7 Perceived national defense interests in a robust
domestic airline industry added to the appeal. To this end, the CAB was charged with “the
promotion, encouragement and development of civil aeronautics, ” and given authority to
accomplish this through control of entry, rate levels and structures, subsidies, and merger
decisions.8
Economic regulation of the U.S. airline industry persisted over the subsequent four
decades in largely unchanged form. Two elements of regulation are most salient for this
analysis: entry restrictions and rate determination.
When the CAB was formed in 1938, existing carriers were given “grandfathered”
operating authority over their existing markets, as is typical in regulatory legislation. The
CAB interpreted the public interest in avoiding destructive competition as implying a high
hurdle for proposed new entry, eﬀectively ruling out de novo entry of any new national
(“trunk”) scheduled passenger service carrier after 1938. During World War II and its
immediate aftermath, the CAB bowed to pressure to authorize entry by carriers providing
service to and from smaller communities. These “local service” carriers were sparingly
certiﬁed and restricted largely to “feeder” routes that avoided competition with existing
trunk carriers. By 1978, they still accounted for fewer than 10% of domestic revenue
passenger-miles (RPMs).9 Mergers led to gradual consolidation in the market, with 11 of
the 16 original grandfathered trunk airlines and a dozen local service and regional carriers
still operating in the late 1970s (Bailey, Graham, and Kaplan, 1985, 15). This consolidation
occurred against a backdrop of explosive traﬃc growth, with compounded annual growth
rates of 14% to 16% in passenger enplanements and revenue-passenger miles between 1938
and 1977 (see Figure 1).
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
Expansion by incumbent carriers was similarly subject to strict oversight. As the
Federal Aviation Report of 1935 argued: “To allow half a dozen airlines to eke out a
hand-to-mouth existence where there is enough traﬃc to support one really ﬁrst-class
service and one alone would be a piece of folly” (in Meyer et al., 1981, 19). Trunk carriers
wishing to expand onto routes served by an existing airline were required to show that
5their entry would not harm the incumbent carrier. The CAB only gradually allowed
expansion of the trunk carriers to erode the highly concentrated route structure preserved
in the grandfathered route networks. Growth of the local service carriers was largely
stiﬂed until the mid-1960s when political pressure against the rising subsidies they were
receiving convinced the CAB to allow them to enter into some proﬁtable higher-density
trunk markets. This system resulted in no more than one or two carriers authorized to
provide service in all but the largest markets. In 1958, for example, twenty-three of the
hundred largest city-pair markets were eﬀectively monopolies; another ﬁfty-seven were
eﬀectively duopolies; and in only two did the three largest carriers have less than a 90%
share.10
CAB authority over route-level entry gave it control over airline network conﬁgu-
rations. Over time, the CAB used this authority to generate implicit cross-subsidies,
awarding lucrative new routes to ﬁnancially weaker carriers and using these awards as
“carrots” to reward carriers for providing service on less-proﬁtable routes (Caves, 1962,
ch. 9). Thus, carrier networks were optimized to maintain industry stability and minimize
subsidies, but had no necessary connection to cost-minimizing or proﬁt-maximizing design.
Though there were concentrations of ﬂight activity in airports at large population centers,
the resulting networks were generally “point-to-point” systems, as illustrated in trunk
carrier route maps (see Figure 2 for an example). Moreover, the regulatory route award
process largely prevented airlines from re-optimizing their networks to reduce operation
costs or improve service as technology and travel patterns changed.
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE
Rate regulation was the second key component of government control. The CAB was
authorized to restrict entry in order to prevent destructive competition, but monopoly
routes raised the specter of monopoly pricing, another concern of legislators during the
1920s and early 1930s. Authority over rates was therefore deemed essential. An inter-
esting transition occurred between the 1934 Act, which focused on maximum rates and
elimination of excess proﬁts, and the 1938 Act, which gave the CAB authority over min-
imum, maximum, and actual fares, at its discretion. Attention shifted from restraining
market power in rate-setting toward ensuring proﬁt adequacy. Control over fares was one
tool given to the Board; another was authority to set airmail rates “suﬃcient to insure
6the performance of such service, and together with all other revenue of the air carrier,
to...maintain and continue the development of air transportation to the extent and of the
character and quality required for the commerce of the United States, the Postal Service,
and the national defense” (italics added, 72 Stat. 763, 49 U.S.C.A. 1376, in Caves, 1962,
129).
In keeping with this focus, the Board approved general fare increases initiated by
carriers and used the level of airmail rates and selective route awards to adjust proﬁts
toward implicit, and later explicit, target levels. Proposed discounts were viewed with
skepticism and typically disallowed on the grounds that they disadvantaged competitors
or were unduly discriminatory across passengers, even if the discounts were associated
with lower quality service characteristics. Over time, the fare structure across markets
became increasingly distorted in its relationship to cost structures, and resulted in fares
substantially above eﬃcient levels in many markets.
Not until the 1970-1974 Domestic Passenger Fare Investigation did the Board develop
a formal cost-based standard for judging the reasonableness of fares. The resulting Stan-
dard Industry Fare Level (SIFL) formula provided a nonlinear distance-based formula for
calculating fares based roughly on industry-level costs, a “reasonable” 12% rate of return,
and target load factor of 55%. SIFL-based fares were intended to eliminate the ratchet
eﬀect and better align the cross-market fare structure with the distance-based economies
of modern jet aircraft. The Board also returned to its historic preference for relatively level
fare structures within markets, opposing a variety of promotional fares within markets on
grounds of both discriminatory pricing and administrative complexity.
A starkly diﬀerent industry structure developed in some intrastate markets, which
were exempt from federal economic regulation by virtue of not crossing state lines and
therefore provided a glimpse of the possibilities of unregulated air travel.11 California
became the poster child for advocates of regulatory reform, as large “lightly regulated”
intrastate California markets could be compared to CAB-regulated interstate markets of
comparable distance and density on the East Coast.12 Similar comparisons ultimately were
drawn for markets in Florida and, following the certiﬁcation of Southwest Airlines in 1971,
in Texas as well. Michael Levine (1965) and William Jordan (1970) focused attention
on California. Levine argued that the scale of the air market between Los Angeles and
7San Francisco-Oakland–the largest market in the world at that time–was attributable in
large part to the higher growth rates stemming from dynamic competition among a number
of carriers that kept frequencies and load factors relatively high and fares remarkably
low: “Although the lowest fare between Boston and Washington, served only by CAB-
certiﬁcated trunk carriers, is $24.65, [intrastate carrier] Paciﬁc Southwest Airlines, using
the same modern turbo-prop equipment, carries passengers between Los Angeles and San
Francisco, only 59 miles closer together, for $11.43. The jet fare is only $13.50” (Levine,
1965, at 1433).
Keeler (1972) reached a similar conclusion based on his estimates of long-run com-
petitive costs for airline service. His structural model, which predicted observed prices on
unregulated intrastate routes to within about three percent of actual fares, suggested that
regulated fares were substantially above competitive long-run costs–with 1968 margins
ranging from 20% to nearly 100% over costs, generally increasing with distance.
High CAB-regulated fares did not translate into supranormal proﬁts for the indus-
try, however. This contrasted to the experience in regulated sectors such as interstate
trucking.13 Keeler (1972, p. 422) argued that high fares in conjunction with apparent nor-
mal rates of return to capital for airlines suggested that “airline regulation extracts high
costs in ineﬃciency on high-density routes.” Carriers responded to high margins with
behavior that increased costs, reduced realized returns, and raised the cost of meeting a
given level of demand for air service. As Kahn (1971, II: 209) argued: “If price is prevented
from falling to marginal cost...then, to the extent that competition prevails, it will tend
to raise cost to the level of price.” Carriers continued to compete for passengers; with the
suppression of price competition, they focused on schedule competition and other aspects
of service quality.
Recognizing the potential signiﬁcance of quality competition, the CAB over its his-
tory attempted direct control of some non-price dimensions of competition. These included
enforcement of connecting ﬂight requirements on many route awards (to restrict nonstop
competition) and limits on the use of ﬁrst-class and sleeper-seat conﬁgurations (or imposi-
tion of fare surcharges for such conﬁgurations). Largely unregulated dimensions of service
quality included a litany of amenities: interior aircraft conﬁguration including seat spac-
ing, inﬂight amenities including food and beverage service and entertainment, even ﬂight
8attendant appearance and services.14
The most costly forms of nonprice competition, however, focused on aircraft type,
capacity, and scheduling. Here, regulatory action was mixed. Competition through new
aircraft introduction was explicitly encouraged by the Board. The CAB consistently re-
fused to allow airlines operating older, slower, and less comfortable aircraft to charge lower
fares than competitors oﬀering service on newer aircraft, even when these lower fares were
argued to be necessary to preserve demand for the lower-quality service. This policy pushed
carriers toward faster adoption and diﬀusion of new aircraft.
Capacity costs were further increased by airline scheduling responses to ﬁxed prices.
With passenger demand a function of price, schedule convenience, and expected seat avail-
ability (the latter also increasing in-ﬂight quality by raising the probability of being next
to an empty seat, and hence, more interior space), suppression of price competition en-
couraged carriers to increase ﬂight frequency and capacity to compete for passengers. The
intensity of ﬂight competition was exacerbated by the apparent S-curve relationship be-
tween passenger share and ﬂight share: a carrier with the majority of capacity on a route
received a disproportionately high share of passengers (Fruhan, 1972; Douglas and Miller,
1974b; Eads, 1975).
As Douglas and Miller (1974a) pointed out, however, competing in ﬂight frequency
is largely a zero-sum game across carriers. Given ﬁxed prices and rivals’ ﬂight schedules,
most of a carrier’s expected increase in passenger volume from adding another ﬂight comes
from business-stealing, not demand expansion. With high price-cost margins and the
CAB legally prohibited from restricting carriers’ ﬂight schedules, the equilibrium of the
non-cooperative game is greater ﬂight frequency and capacity, lower load factors (seats
sold divided by seats available), and higher average costs per passenger-mile. For example,
average load factors in unregulated California intrastate markets exceeded 71% over 1960-
1965, more than 15 percentage points higher than overall average load factors for trunk
airlines in regulated markets over the same period (Keeler, 1972, 414). Load factors in
regulated airline markets not only decreased with the number of competitors on a route,
but also declined with distance (Douglas and Miller, 1974a; Eads, 1975, 28-30). Observed
load factors appeared to be lower than optimal load factors based on reasonable estimates
of passengers’ time valuations for all but relatively short monopoly markets (Douglas and
9Miller, 1974a, 91; Eads, 1975, 30).
Moreover, when the CAB attempted to increase rates of return by increasing prices, as
it did at various points in its history, service competition intensiﬁed, leading to even lower
load factors and higher average costs. As Douglas and Miller (1974a, 54) argued, “the fare
level and structure, instead of determining or controlling proﬁt rates, should be viewed
principally as determining ... the relative level of excess capacity and the associated level
of service quality.” Board eﬀorts to raise carrier proﬁts by increasing fares led to what
became known as the “ratchet eﬀect, ” increased ﬂight frequency and declining load factors,
and ultimately raised average costs rather than proﬁtability. By the early 1970s, average
load factors had fallen below 50% for the ﬁrst time since CAB regulation (see ﬁgure 3).
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE
While rent dissipation through scheduling competition is well-documented, there is less
clear evidence on whether labor also extracted a share of the proﬁts. In some industries,
regulatory rents were shared with labor, either through increased employment, increased
wages, or some combination of both; e.g., Rose (1987) for estimates of labor rent-sharing in
the regulated trucking industry, and Hendricks (1994) and Peoples (1998) for cross-industry
comparisons. There is some reason to think airline workers would similarly beneﬁt from
regulation: airlines were heavily unionized and unions were often contentious. Dependence
on key occupations such as pilots, FAA certiﬁcation requirements that eﬀectively precluded
airlines from replacing ﬂight operations personnel during strikes, interunion rivalry for
members of a given occupation class across ﬁrms, cooperation across unions representing
diﬀerent occupations within a ﬁrm, and CAB limits on airline entry and price competition
all tended to enhance labor’s ability to capture rents. But not all factors tilted in the
direction of labor strength: the ability of ﬁrms to use the Railway Labor Act provisions
to delay or block strikes stemming from contract disputes, the lack of national bargaining
units, and the 1958 creation of the Mutual Aid Pact, under which airlines agreed to cross-
ﬁrm strike insurance payments, served to limit labor gains.15 In addition, while regulated
prices prevented airlines with lower labor costs from capturing market share by under-
pricing higher-cost rivals, regulated prices were set on the basis of industry rather than
ﬁrm-speciﬁc costs, implying possible high-powered proﬁt incentives for ﬁrms to reduce
costs relative to industry norms.16
10Empirical evidence suggests that pilots, in particular, were eﬀective in negotiating pay
and work rule agreements that captured a signiﬁcant share of productivity enhancements
due to adoption of larger, faster aircraft (Caves, 1962, 110). Comparisons of pilot wages
and productivity levels between regulated carriers and intrastate carrier PSA are consistent
with this pattern, although much of the productivity diﬀerence may be attributed directly
to diﬀerential scheduling and ﬂeet use resulting from PSA’s focus on price rather than
quality competition (Eads, 1975). Empirical estimates of the extent of regulatory labor
wage gains based on wage responses to airline deregulation suggest relatively modest eﬀects,
on the order 10 to 15% of wages (Card, 1997; Peoples, 1998; Hirsch and Macpherson, 2000;
Hirsch, 2006). Hendricks, Feuille, and Szerszen (1980) argue that estimates based on wage
declines after deregulation may understate rent capture. They point out that deregulation
increased the airlines’ cost of strikes due to mandated elimination of the Mutual Aid Pact
and increased competitive disadvantage of ﬁrms that faced strikes in deregulated markets,
and provided little immediate change in unionization rates or in market structure. Some
support for their view is provided by Hirsch and Macpherson (2000) and Hirsch (2006),
who ﬁnd larger relative airline wage declines over time, and some evidence that wages
follow ﬁrm proﬁtability cycles.
II. Airline Deregulation in the United States
In the mid-1970s, airline regulation began a drastic transformation.17 Hearings held
by Senator Edward Kennedy’s Judiciary Committee in early 1975 dramatized the costs
and inconsistencies of CAB regulation, and seem to have pushed airline regulation onto
the national agenda.18 Over the next three years, congressional hearings on the industry
paralleled administrative reforms.
The appointment of pro-reform chairmen to the CAB heralded a dramatic departure
in the Board’s attitude toward regulation. The CAB became increasingly receptive to
reform, approving discount fares and expanded charter operations under chair John Robson
in 1976. This accelerated with the appointment of economist Alfred Kahn as chair in
1977 and Elizabeth Bailey as CAB member. Kahn–whose 1971 book remains today the
preeminent analysis of the origins, principles, and eﬀects of economic regulation–led the
Board through a series of administrative reforms that reversed the agency’s traditional
preference for regulation over market determination of outcomes.
11Political forces coalesced around legislative deregulation in 1978, with industry oppo-
sition splintering and eventually giving way with the passage of the Airline Deregulation
Act by Congress, signed into law by President Carter in October 1978. The Act provided
for a phaseout of regulatory authority by January 1983, and elimination of the CAB itself
by 1985. The most signiﬁcant regulatory legacy was a continuing program of subsidies and
oversight of service to small communities under the “Essential Air Service” program. The
EAS was supposed to phase out in the 1980s, but political forces have kept it alive to this
day. For service to all but these very small airports, however, the transition to deregulated
markets occurred quite rapidly.
The conﬂuence of several factors in the mid-1970s contributed to this re-examination
and eventual repudiation of federal airline regulation in the United States: the contrast
of CAB-set fares with fares in the intrastate California, Texas, and Florida markets, an
increasing body of research documenting the problems with federal airline regulation, and
political concern with rising price levels economy-wide and stagnant economic growth, ex-
acerbated by the 1973-1974 OPEC oil price shock.19 None of this, however, provides an
entirely satisfactory explanation for why the airline industry was deregulated, or why it
happened in 1978 and not earlier (or later). Though an important role must be assigned
to political entrepreneurship by Senator Ted Kennedy and administrative reforms imple-
mented by Alfred Kahn, these were probably not the only determinants, particularly given
the coincidence of airline deregulation with regulatory reform across such disparate indus-
tries as trucking, natural gas, and banking, among others (Joskow and Rose, 1989; Joskow
and Noll, 1994). Peltzman (1989) argues that changing economic interests in regulation
were an important contributor (but see the comments on his paper in the same volume);
Joskow and Noll (1994) and their commentators argue for a more multi-faceted political
economy interpretation. With few such deregulatory events, however, it is diﬃcult to dis-
entangle the complex interactions that lead to such major changes in the role government
plays in the business economy.
The CAB moved quickly to implement provisions of the Airline Deregulation Act of
1978 and accelerated the shift from government to market decision-making in the indus-
try. Many entrepreneurs were quick to respond to the new opportunities–new entrants
proliferated and some incumbents expanded rapidly–while management at some of the
12“legacy” airlines proved to be much less nimble. The impact of deregulation became ev-
ident in several areas: Removing regulatory price controls was followed by lower average
prices, a substantial increase in price variation, and eﬀorts to soften price competition
through diﬀerentiation and increases in brand loyalty. Lifting entry restrictions altered
market structure at the industry, airport and route levels, and led to re-organization of
incumbent airline networks. The industry also developed new organizational forms, in-
cluding code-sharing and alliances across airlines, particularly in the aftermath of tighter
merger policy. Shifting from nonprice to price competition reduced many aspects of ser-
vice quality, although the quality declines of most concern to customers are most likely
attributable not to deregulation but to government infrastructure policy, as we discuss
later. While some of these impacts were anticipated during the debate over deregulation,
others were quite unexpected (e.g., Kahn, 1988).
A. Price levels, dispersion, and loyalty programs
The aftermath of U.S. airline deregulation seemed to conﬁrm the forecasts of academic
economists and others who predicted substantial fare reductions and concomitant traﬃc
growth. Between 1978 and 1988, average domestic yield (revenue per passenger-mile), as
shown in Figure 3, declined in real terms at a rate of 2.2% per year, while revenue passenger-
miles, shown in Figure 1, increased at a rate of 6.1% per year. In the subsequent 19 years,
real yields declined at 2.6% per year, and traﬃc grow at an annual compounded rate of
3.1%.
Such ﬁgures are often presented to argue the success of airline deregulation. A compar-
ison to the pre-deregulation era, however, demonstrates that the argument for deregulation
must be made much more thoughtfully: In the decade prior to the onset of deregulation,
1968-1978, real domestic yield declined at a rate of 2.1% per year and traﬃc growth
outpaced the post-deregulation period, an annual rate of 7.6%. Thus, examination of
deregulation requires a more carefully constructed counterfactual.
1. Price levels: In examining airline prices, one appealing counterfactual is the regulatory
cost-based Standard Industry Fare Level (SIFL) formula created by the CAB to determine
fares just prior to deregulation. The Department of Transportation continues to update
this formula based on input cost and productivity changes in part for use in US-Canada
13fare negotiations.20 Figure 4 presents a comparison of passenger-mile-weighted average
yields and SIFL-based yields for tickets in Databank 1A’s ten percent sample of all airline
tickets.21 Actual fares were about 29% lower than SIFL-formula fares in 2007, suggesting
a consumer welfare increase in the range of $30 billion in that year.22
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE
Even this comparison merits closer scrutiny, however. Three underlying assumptions
are critical. First, the SIFL calculation takes productivity gains in the industry as exoge-
nous. If deregulation brought about some of these gains, and they would not have occurred
under regulation, then the SIFL is understating the counterfactual fares and understating
the beneﬁts of deregulation.23 Second, the SIFL assumes a 55% load factor, while planes
are much more crowded than that, with domestic load factors hitting 80% in 2007. If, for
a given schedule of ﬂights, 80% of costs are assumed to be invariant to changes in the load
factor (i.e., to the number of passengers ﬂown) over this range, 24 then adjusting for the
change in load factor would spread those costs over 45% more passengers (80% divided
by 55%). The eﬀect would be to lower the SIFL for 2007 by 25% (1 − (0.2+0 .8/1.45))
and the consumer gains from deregulation would be about 84% smaller. Finally, the SIFL
formula was for full-fare coach tickets, but even prior to deregulation limited discounting
was permitted. Richards (2007) presents evidence that actual average coach fares were
about 15% below SIFL in 1977, just prior to deregulation, though signiﬁcant relaxation of
fare controls had already occurred by then. Obviously, if actual average coach fares would
have been 15% below SIFL under regulation, that alone would eliminate about half of the
beneﬁts typically calculated.
These potential changes highlight the diﬃculty in calculating a true counterfactual
against which to judge airline deregulation. Much more important than these technical
corrections, however, is the underlying assumption that airline regulation would not have
changed. For example, it is quite possible that incentive mechanisms, as have become com-
mon in electricity regulation, would have been adopted under continued airline regulation
and led to some of the productivity improvements that have occurred under deregulation.
On the other hand, the continuation of regulatory control would have made it easier for
politicians or even the airlines themselves, to subvert the regulatory process to their own
advantage.25 Similarly, more than a quarter century of deregulation has taught lessons
14about antitrust and consumer protection that would likely inﬂuence and, one hopes, im-
prove public policy towards a less regulated airline industry.
Regardless of exactly how one calculates the fare declines attributable to deregulation,
it is clear that the gains from those lower prices have not been distributed uniformly across
customers. For example, though average fares were 29% below SIFL in 2007, about 26%
of economy class passengers paid a fare greater than the SIFL for the route on which
they were ﬂying. While deregulation advocates argued that the CAB may have allowed
too little variation in fares–failing to account for diﬀerence across carriers in their service
amenities, not permitting oﬀ-peak discounts in order to align fares with variations in the
shadow costs of capacity, and not recognizing diﬀerential costs across leisure and business
customers–few if any people predicted the resulting enormous range of prices, both across
a n dw i t h i nr o u t e s . 26 Across routes, the beneﬁts have also not been spread evenly: relative
to the SIFL (and pre-deregulation prices), fares have fallen more on long routes than on
short routes. Fares have also remained higher in concentrated markets and on ﬂights in
and out of airports dominated by a single carrier, all else equal.
2. Variation in prices across routes: There is considerable variation in average price
levels across routes, and this variation has not been stable over time. The lower line in
Figure 5 shows the coeﬃcient of variation of route average fares after controlling for route
distance.27 Cross-route price variation peaked in 1996 at a level that was more than twice
the variation in 1979 and 69% higher than in 2007.
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The identity of competitors, in addition to the presence of competition, appears to be
an important determinant of route average price levels. Since before airline deregulation,
there have been “no-frills” or “low-cost” carriers that have operated with much lower costs
than the regulated legacy airlines, though they operated solely intrastate before 1978.
The best known of these today is Southwest, but many others have entered and most
have failed over the nearly three decades since deregulation. This failure rate is especially
puzzling given the enormous cost advantages they seemed to maintain. Figure 6 tracks the
standard industry cost measure of cents per available seat-mile (ASM), 28 in constant 2007
dollars, for the legacy carriers (and their successor companies) and for the largest low-cost
15entrants that have operated since deregulation, many of which did not survive or have
made trips through bankruptcy court.29 The presence of these low-cost competitors on a
route substantially dampens average fare levels; see, for example, Borenstein (1989) and
Morrison (2001) for recent analyses. In the last few years, the encroachment of low-cost
carriers seems to have accelerated, due in part to continued expansion of Southwest and
in part to the rapid growth of some other low-cost airlines (see Figure 7).
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3. Variation in prices across passengers on the same route: Despite the CAB’s historic
reluctance to deviate from very simple fare structures, some price variation is undoubtedly
eﬃcient in the airline industry. With ﬁxed capacity, a non-storable product, and demand
that varies both predictably and stochastically, eﬃcient prices will vary intertemporally
with demand realizations. Even tickets on the same ﬂight purchased at diﬀerent times
may eﬃciently carry diﬀerent prices (See Prescott, 1975; Salop, 1978; and Dana 1999a and
1999b). Moreover, Ramsey-Boiteux prices yield diﬀerential mark-ups across customers
based on relative price elasticities of demand as the constrained welfare-maximizing solu-
tion to compensating ﬁrms with substantial ﬁxed costs. While these considerations suggest
deviations from the relatively level regulated fare structure, however, few observers were
prepared for the often-bewildering array of fares available (and prices actually paid by
diﬀerent passengers) on any given airline-route.
INSERT FIGURE 7 HERE
The CAB’s “administrative deregulation” push over 1976-1978 encouraged airlines to
experiment with pricing. Airlines were quick to use pricing ﬂexibility to introduce fare
variation. In 1977, American Airlines took advantage of the CAB’s new push toward fare
ﬂexibility to introduce a menu of “Super Saver” fare schedules. These were targeted at
increasing air travel among leisure travelers, with ticket restrictions that included both
advanced purchase (14 or 21 days) and minimum stay (7 days or longer, generally). With
deregulation in 1978, discount fares ﬂourished. Airlines soon recognized that Saturday-
night stay restrictions were nearly as eﬀective as minimum stay requirements in excluding
low-elasticity business travelers from discount fare purchases, and imposed lower costs
on the high-elasticity discretionary customers at whom the low fares were aimed. The
16Saturday-night stay restriction replaced minimum stay on discount tickets in most markets,
and became the standard self-selection device for major airlines over the next twenty-ﬁve
years.
The eﬀect of this was an almost immediate boost in fare dispersion. The highest
(dashed) line in ﬁgure 5 shows the average within-route coeﬃcient of variation of fares.
Such a measure of dispersion aggregates within carrier-route dispersion with variation in
average prices across carriers on a route. The slightly-lower solid line on ﬁgure 5 shows the
average within carrier-route dispersion, demonstrating that most of the price variation is
due to individual airlines charging diﬀerent prices to diﬀerent customers on the same route
(and on the same ﬂight).
Average levels of fare dispersion mask signiﬁcant diﬀerences across carriers and routes,
however. Some carriers, particularly among the low-cost and entrant airlines, have rela-
tively few ticket categories, and relatively low gradients of fare increases as restrictions are
removed. Others may have 20 or more diﬀerent ticket restriction/price combinations avail-
able for purchase on a given route. Moreover, there appear to be substantial diﬀerences
across routes in dispersion. Borenstein and Rose (1994) analyze the determinants of price
dispersion, with particular attention to the impact of competition, using a cross-section of
carrier-routes in 1987. That work suggests that dispersion increased with the move from
monopoly to duopoly to more competitive route structures. This ﬁnding is consistent with
price discrimination based not only on customer heterogeneity in their overall elasticity of
demand for air travel (e.g., across business and leisure travelers), but also on heterogeneity
in cross-brand price elasticities, such as might result from diﬀerences in airline loyalty.
Over time, however, fare structures grew even more complex, with an increasing vari-
ety of advanced purchase durations (3, 7, 14, and 21 days being most common), discounts
for low-travel demand days or times, temporary price promotions, negotiated corporate
discounts, upgradeable economy tickets, and most recently, web-only, auction-determined
and “buyer oﬀer” prices. The spread between the top unrestricted fares and lowest dis-
counted fares also increased. Accompanying this has been the development and increasing
sophistication of management systems that monitor the evolution of demand relative to
forecast demand, set overbooking limits, and allocate seats to each fare “bucket” to max-
imize expected revenue for the airline (Belobaba, 1987). American Airlines, which was in
17the vanguard of developing these systems, reported that yield management systems added
approximately $500 million, or roughly 5%, to annual revenue for the airline in the early
1990s (Smith et al., 1992). This is an enormous eﬀect, of the same order of magnitude
as the total net income/sales ratios for the industry. Revenue management systems have
become an important management and strategic tool, with simulation estimates suggesting
“the potential for revenue gains of 1%-2% from advanced network revenue management
methods, above and beyond the 4%-6% gains realized from conventional leg-based fare
class control” (Barnhart, Belobaba, and Odoni, 2003, 383).
As illustrated by the closeness of the two higher curves in ﬁgure 5, cross-carrier vari-
ation in mean prices contributes relatively little to within-route dispersion; most is at-
tributable to the enormous variation in prices any one carrier charges in a given market.
The pattern illustrated in this ﬁgure is consistent with increasing concern over fare struc-
ture complexity and price dispersion through the 1990s. Price dispersion within carrier-
routes more than doubled between 1979 and 2001. The 2001 coeﬃcient of variation of 0.72
implies a standard deviation that is nearly three-quarters of the mean fare. Since 2001
within-route dispersion has declined to levels not seen since the 1980s. This has been ac-
companied by declines in cross-route price dispersion; as discussed later, both may reﬂect
the impact of greater low-cost carrier competition.
4. Loyalty programs: American Airlines led the industry into the use of loyalty programs
with its introduction of the ﬁrst frequent ﬂyer program in 1980. Other airlines quickly fol-
lowed. Since then, airlines have oﬀered loyalty programs not only for individual customers
in the form of frequent ﬂyer programs, but also for travel agents who steer clients their
way, and to corporations in the form of quantity-based discounts. Frequent ﬂyer programs
evolved into businesses on their own in the late 1980s as airlines began to sell frequent
ﬂyer points to other retailers–hotels, supermarkets, credit cards for example–to then be
given to customers. While other retail sectors have followed suit with their own loyalty
programs, airline frequent ﬂyer programs remain by far the most successful.30
Loyalty programs typically reward travelers or travel agents with a nonlinear schedule
of potential rewards, generating an increasing return to incremental purchases. The pro-
grams for individuals and travel agents also take advantage of an incentive conﬂict that may
exist between the entity paying for the ticket (often the individual’s employer or the agent’s
18customer) and the person receiving the loyalty bonus (the traveler or travel agent).31 Loy-
alty programs soften price competition across carriers, as they induce a switching cost for
travelers (or travel agents) by raising net cost if travel is spread over several airlines rather
than concentrated on a single airline over time.32 The programs also link service across
markets, basing rewards on the total amount purchased from the airline in all markets, not
just one city-pair, and providing greater redemption opportunities on airlines with sub-
stantial service in a passenger’s home market. In this way, they potentially further insulate
large network carriers from competition on individual routes, particularly out of their hubs.
More recent reﬁnements to the programs leverage the eﬀect, by targeting rewards such as
preferential boarding and seating, upgrade availability, and free travel availability only to
the highest volume travelers ﬂying 50,000, 100,000 or more miles on the airline within a
calendar year.
During the 1980s, policymakers became concerned that some airlines used distribution
systems to unfairly insulate themselves from price competition. Until the late 1990s, travel
agents issued more than 80% of all airline tickets, with the bulk of the remainder issued
directly by the airlines. In the 1980s, agents started using computer reservation systems
(CRSs) that allowed them to directly access airline availability and fare information. CRSs
grew out of airlines’ internal computer systems and were originally owned by the airlines.
This raised the potential for airline owners to bias the systems’ response to information
queries in a way that advantaged them and limited price competition. Concern about
bias of information displays in favor of one carrier became a competitive issue for much of
the 1980s and 1990s, ultimately leading to formal regulatory restrictions on CRS display
criteria in 1984 and 1992.33
This concern has faded with the second major innovation in the distribution: use of
the internet. As users of sophisticated electronic reservation and ticketing interfaces with
travel agents, the airlines were well-prepared to move into internet sales of their product,
and airline and independent travel agencies were early adopters of internet marketing and
sales. This had particular appeal to airlines, who saw the internet as a way to bypass the
traditional sales channel, travel agents, in favor of lower-cost electronic ticketing methods.
For years, airlines had complained about ineﬃciency of travel agency distribution and
the high cost of travel agent commissions, at 10% or more of ticket prices. No single
19airline was willing to reduce their commission rate unilaterally, however, fearing that travel
agents would “book away” from them. With the diﬀusion of internet sales, carriers saw
an alternative.
In the last decade, online ticketing has skyrocketed, comprising more than 30% of
sales in 2002 (GAO, 2003). Airlines have gradually eliminated travel agent commissions
on domestic tickets and reduced commissions on international tickets. They now generally
charge higher distribution fees for tickets not sold electronically, even for those booked
directly with the airline over the phone. While reduced travel agency commissions and
online ticketing have dramatically reduced airlines’ distribution costs, the internet also has
made it easier for customers to shop for low fares, ﬁnd alternative airlines and routings,
and generally become better informed about travel options and their costs. Some have
argued that the greater transparency of airline fare structures to ﬁnal consumers may
have contributed substantially to reduced bookings for full-fare, unrestricted, tickets, and
explain at least part of the collapse in intra-carrier price dispersion. While online travel
search engines could be susceptible to display bias of various kinds (an issue that has
attracted considerable attention with respect to their hotel listings, for example), the
largest systems claim to present neutral airline displays, and allow consumers to re-sort
search results according to a variety of criteria.
B. Entry and exit, airline networks, and market structure
1. Entry and exit: Expansion by existing carriers and entry by new ﬁrms dramatically
altered industry structure in the immediate aftermath of deregulation. The eleven trunk
and dozen local service/Alaska/Hawaii “legacy” carriers authorized to provide regulated
jet service prior to 1978 were joined by forty-seven new entrants by 1984. Most of the new
entrants and some of the legacy carriers left the industry through acquisition or liquidation
over the subsequent decade; forty-eight carriers exited between 1984 and 1987 alone. Figure
8 records the number of airlines entering or exiting the industry, as well as the number of
airline bankruptcy ﬁlings, each year.34 Of the carriers who began interstate service through
1984, only seven operated in 1990, and only two remain in operation today.35 This appears
to reﬂect more than transitional uncertainty in the aftermath of deregulation. Entry peaked
again in the mid-1990s, with eighteen independent new entrants between 1993 and 1995,
only three of which remained in operation through 2007.36 By 2007, twenty-nine years
20after deregulation, nine of the twenty-three legacy carriers continued to serve the domestic
market, with a combined domestic market share of 65%.37
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Financial distress, reorganization and exit have been as much a part of the industry
as new entry since deregulation. Of the seven airlines that currently carry at least 5% each
of domestic U.S. traﬃc, ﬁve (Continental, USAir, Delta, United, and Northwest) have
ﬁled Chapter 11 bankruptcy at least once. Only American and Southwest have not gone
through bankruptcy reorganization. We discuss the causes of this ﬁnancial volatility in
section IV, but emphasize here that Chapter 11 bankruptcy ﬁlings do not equate with an
airline shutting down. Although some of the carriers that have entered bankruptcy have
been liquidated, the majority have emerged to operate as publicly-held companies or been
merged into another airline, generally with operations disrupted for little or no time.
While bankruptcies are costly for the aﬀected ﬁrms’ shareholders and their workers,
and are broadly disparaged by politicians and industry lobbyists, there is little evidence
that they harm competitors or consumers. Borenstein and Rose (1995) found that airlines
tend to lower their fares before entering bankruptcy, but healthy competitors don’t follow
and the fare declines are generally short-lived. When bankrupt carriers do reduce service,
other airlines generally are quick to jump into their abandoned markets. Borenstein and
Rose (2003) ﬁnd no statistically discernible eﬀect on the service to small and large air-
ports when a carrier with operations at the airport declares bankruptcy. Even at medium
sized airports, where they do ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect, total service to the air-
port declines by less than half the number of ﬂights that the ﬁling carrier oﬀered before
bankruptcy.
2. Airline networks: Incumbent airlines responded to elimination of regulatory restrictions
on routes they could serve by restructuring as well as expanding their networks. The
almost immediate transformation from the point-to-point systems created by the CAB
entry policies into hub-and-spoke networks was perhaps the most unanticipated result of
deregulation, and fundamentally altered the economics of airline operations. The new
networks served passengers traveling to and from the central hub airports with nonstop
service, and passengers traveling between two points on the spokes with change-of-plane
21service through hub airports.
The hub-and-spoke conﬁguration provides cost, demand, and competitive advantages.
Hubs generally increase available ﬂight options for passengers traveling to and from hubs
and facilitate more convenient service on routes for which demand is not suﬃcient to
support frequent nonstop service at relatively low prices. Operating cost economies arise
from the increased density of operations, allowing the airline to oﬀer frequent service
on a segment while maintaining high load factors. At the same time, because very few
airports have the logistic or economic capacity to support more than one large-scale hub
operation, competition at the hub airports typically is quite limited, yielding substantial
market power for airlines at their own hubs. In addition, the frequent ﬂights and extensive
destinations available on the hub airline tend to give that airline a demand advantage versus
its competitors on routes out of the hub (Borenstein, 1991), arising from fundamental
consumer preferences and substantially enhanced by the development of airline loyalty
programs subsequent to deregulation. These eﬀects have been reﬂected in less competition
on routes to/from hub airports compared to other markets.
Examining concentration for trips to and from the twelve major hubs that have existed
since shortly after deregulation38 reveals an interesting pattern. These routes were slightly
less concentrated than the national average until the mid-1980s, but diverged markedly by
1989, with hub-route HHIs averaging 0.51 versus 0.42 for non-hub routes. Since then, the
diﬀerence has gradually narrowed. In the most recent data, concentration is again higher
on non-hub routes.
3. Market Structure: While the early entry wave substantially reduced concentration
in deregulated airline markets, merger activity in the mid-1980s acted as a substantial
counterweight. Mergers peaked in the mid-1980s, when antitrust policy was relatively lax
and greater credence was given to the view that potential competition could discipline
prices as eﬀectively as actual competition. By 1990, as antitrust policy became stricter
in general and concerns about airline competition and hub dominance increased, merger
activity slowed considerably. Since then, nearly all mergers have involved at least one
airline that was in extreme ﬁnancial distress. Other merger proposals, such as the US-
Air/United merger proposed in 1999, met with suﬃcient threat of antitrust opposition
that they usually were withdrawn.
22As mergers declined, alternative forms of linkages were introduced. In the 1980s, U.S.
major airlines had pioneered partnerships with small commuter airlines that allowed each
carrier to sell tickets for trips that use the commuter airline to bring the passenger to the
carrier’s hub and then the large carrier to ﬂy between major airports. These partnerships
allowed coordination of schedules and “code-sharing, ” which presented the product as a
single-airline ticket. Other carriers, most notably American, chose instead to vertically in-
tegrate into the commuter airline business, buying some commuter carriers and expanding
their ﬂeet to form American Eagle, which is wholly owned by American Airlines.39
Code-sharing alliances between major carriers began with agreements between U.S.
and foreign air carriers as a response to regulation of entry on international routes.40 By the
late 1990s, these were extended to relationships among many large U.S. airlines. Northwest
and Continental, for instance, formed an alliance that allowed each to sell tickets under its
own brand name that included ﬂights on the other airline. These alliances, domestic and
international, now generally include cooperative arrangements for frequent ﬂyer plans,
joint marketing, facilities-sharing, and scheduling, though prices are required to be set
independently.
Economic analyses suggest that alliances create value for customers, by converting
inter-airline connections to apparent online connections and by allowing airlines to coor-
dinate schedules to improve the quality of those connections. Bamburger, Carlton and
Neumann (2004) analyze the Continental/America West and Northwest/Alaska alliances,
and conclude that prices declined in markets where the alliance created an “online” code-
shared ﬂight from an interline connection across the two carriers. They ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
increase in traﬃc in those markets for the Continental/America West alliance. Armantier
and Richard (2006) report similar ﬁndings for code-shared connecting itineraries in the
Northwest and Continental alliance, but report higher prices for nonstop ﬂights by al-
liance carriers. Armantier and Richard’s (2008) analysis of net consumer welfare eﬀects
suggests that surplus gains by connecting passengers were oﬀset by surplus losses of non-
stop passengers.41 Lederman (2007) ﬁnds evidence of an additional consumer beneﬁt in
her analysis of international alliances: an airline’s domestic demand appears to increase
as a result of travel opportunities created by a new international alliance. This has mixed
implications for consumers in equilibrium, however. If, as seems plausible, this results from
23demand spillovers through a more attractive frequent ﬂyer plan, the loyalty eﬀect of the
frequent ﬂyer plan may provide incentives for ultimately raising prices.
The net eﬀect of these various changes in the industry was a decline in average con-
centration at the route level in the immediate aftermath of deregulation. From an average
route-level Herﬁndahl Index (HHI) of about 0.61 in 1979, the HHI declined on both hub and
non-hub routes through the early 1980s (see Figure 9) with the national average HHI hitting
its lowest point of 0.43 in 1986. Concentration, particularly on hub routes, rose from the
late 1980s through the late 1990s. In the past few years, concentration levels for all routes
has averaged about 0.52. How much of this re-consolidation was inevitable in an unregu-
lated market and how much was the result of ancillary government policies including liberal
merger policy continues to be debated. Two unanticipated developments–reconﬁguration
of airline route networks into hub-and-spoke systems, and strategic innovations in loyalty
programs that diﬀerentiated airlines’ services and dampened competition–contributed to
increases in route-level concentration. Government policies, however, particularly with
respect to antitrust, exacerbated any latent tendencies toward concentration. The ques-
tion of whether market power concerns require something more than antitrust attention
continues to surface; we address it in section IV.
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C. Service Quality
Once carriers were free to compete on price, the nature of competition required reeval-
uation. Historically, airlines have found it easier to diﬀerentiate price across passengers
on a route than quality (apart from premium class service–business or ﬁrst–with its
own cabin), though recently there has been greater use of priority boarding and access to
upgrades and preferred seating for an airline’s most valued customers (generally based on
frequent ﬂyer status and undiscounted fare tickets). Some quality attributes associated
with network reconﬁguration and increased density, such as ﬂight frequency and online
connections, were maintained or improved following deregulation. Others, such as safety
levels which continue to be regulated, were unaﬀected. Many, particularly those associated
with on-board amenities, have been reduced. Airport congestion and ﬂight delays, which
are among the most visible and signiﬁcant declines in service quality, may be attributed
24more to the success of deregulation in increasing traﬃc and to the failure of infrastructure
policy to keep pace with traﬃc growth than to altered carrier decisions under economic
deregulation. Reduced levels of service quality overall do not imply that consumers as a
group are worse oﬀ, though quality-loving, price-inelastic consumers may well be. We dis-
cuss below deregulatory impacts on service quality with respect to some of the key service
quality metrics.
1. Flight frequency and connections: The reorganization of airline networks following
deregulation led to increased frequency for service to and from hub airports and reduced
non-stop service between smaller airports, all else equal (see Bailey, Graham, and Kaplan,
1985, 83-86). There is a common view that deregulation led to a signiﬁcant increase in the
share of passengers that had to change planes. The change, however, was actually quite
small. The dashed line in ﬁgure 10 presents the share of domestic passengers who changed
planes from 1979-2007. These raw data, however, do not account for another change that
was occurring at the same time: the average trip distance was increasing–from 873 miles
in 1979 to 1056 in 2007–so more people were ﬂying longer distance trips on which changing
planes is more common. The solid line in ﬁgure 10 presents the same data adjusted for trip
length.42 Controlling for trip distance, a substantially smaller share of customers changed
planes in 2007 than in 1979.
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Some studies of airline deregulation have also noted the drastic decline in interline
connections–those involving a connection between two diﬀerent airlines–after deregula-
tion. Because online connecting service (change of aircraft but no change of airline) is
associated with improved connections and better baggage handling, this improved the es-
timated net quality of service. In fact, the share of connections that were interline fell from
45% in 1979 to 8% in the early 1990s. It began to rise again in 1996, however, with the
spread of code-sharing arrangements. It is more diﬃcult to interpret interline statistics
now, because some code-sharing is between carriers that share some or all ownership, while
others are between companies with only weak aﬃliations. In any case, by 2007 the share
of connections reported in the DOT’s Databank 1B that are interline had risen back to
44%.
25Greater passenger volume has facilitated in many markets an increase in ﬂight fre-
quency, relative to the high price, low volume regulatory model. Figure 11 records changes
in domestic service levels between 1984 and 2007. Not only has the number of ﬂights
approximately doubled over the two decades, the number of markets with nonstop service
is up almost 75%.
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Figure 11 shows a dramatic increase in the number of cities with nonstop service
beginning in the late 1990s. This change corresponds to the widespread introduction of
regional jets (RJs), jet aircraft with capacities of less than 100 passengers that can be
eﬃcient for routes previously served by propeller aircraft and by larger jets. RJ ﬂights
increased from 40 per day in 1997 to over 8800 per day in 2007, about one-third of all
domestic commercial ﬂights. In 2007, the median distance of an RJ ﬂight was 478 miles,
with 25% of ﬂights less than 273 miles and 10% of ﬂights over 853 miles, so these new
aircraft clearly can play a variety of roles. One of those roles is introduction of nonstop
service on routes that previously had none. Of the 2157 airport-pairs that gained nonstop
service between July 1997 and July 2007, about one-third received at least some of that
service with regional jets. Overall, 28% of RJ ﬂights in July 2007 were on routes that had
no nonstop service in July 1997.
2. Load factors: Given the tendency toward ineﬃciently low load factors during the reg-
ulatory period (Douglas and Miller, 1974a, 1974b), it is not surprising that load factors
generally have increased since 1978, as shown in Figure 3. Average load factors for do-
mestic scheduled service climbed from lows of under ﬁfty percent prior to deregulation, to
over sixty percent in the mid-1980s, and have remained above seventy percent since the
late 1990s, hitting 80% in 2007. While much of this increase is due to carriers’ ability to
compete on price in addition to ﬂight frequency, it has been facilitated by the increasing
sophistication of airline booking systems. These systems manage dynamic demand fore-
casts and seat allocation to the myriad fare classes, enabling airlines to ﬁll seats that would
otherwise go empty with a low-fare passenger, while reserving seats for likely last-minute
high-fare passengers.
Since most costs do not vary with the number of passengers on a ﬂight, higher load
26factors have contributed to lower costs per revenue passenger-mile. But they have also
led to lower quality ﬂight experiences for consumers. With high load factors, late-booking
travelers may not ﬁnd a seat on their preferred ﬂight, in-ﬂight experiences are less likely
to be comfortable, and rebooking to accommodate missed connections or canceled ﬂights
becomes increasingly diﬃcult. Gone are the days of almost being assured an empty middle
seat on most cross-country ﬂights. While many travelers complain about crowded planes,
it is important to recognize that airlines have the option of oﬀering higher price, less-
crowded ﬂights. That virtually none choose to do so suggests that passenger demand is
not suﬃcient to justify the price/cost tradeoﬀ.43
3. In-ﬂight amenities: Quantifying the provision of in-ﬂight amenities is diﬃcult, but it
seems clear that this area has experienced perhaps the greatest decline in quality since
deregulation. The days of piano bars in 747s and gourmet meals are long past for most
domestic travelers. More signiﬁcant for many passengers has been the decrease in their
space on-board. Coach class seat width and pitch has decreased, even while Americans’
girths have increased, and high load factors make empty middle seats less and less common.
The decline in amenities has not been monotonic or universal, however. In recent years,
airlines have abandoned the headset or movie charges they previously imposed for in-ﬂight
entertainment, and some, like Jet Blue, promote their service with in-ﬂight entertainment
options. American and United have experimented with increases in seat spacing for at
least some service. However, carriers that have diﬀerentiated themselves primarily by
oﬀering plusher on-board service have not been particularly successful, suggesting that
when passengers vote with their wallets, low prices generally beat higher quality.
4. Oversales and denied boarding: With ﬁxed capacity, uncertain demand, and last-minute
cancellations or no-shows among passengers, airlines generally have found it optimal to of-
fer more tickets than there are seats on a given ﬂight. In the instances in which more
passengers than anticipated show up for an oversold ﬂight, some passengers will be denied
boarding. The CAB addressed this concern in 1979 with a rulemaking on denied boarding
compensation. Rather than ban oversales (one proposal that was not adopted), the Board
attempted a market-based solution, which has persisted through today. Airlines are re-
quired ﬁrst to seek volunteers to give up their seats, for some compensation that is at the
discretion of the airline. Airlines may have some “standard oﬀer” compensation, though
27many conduct informal auctions, increasing oﬀered compensation (usually in the form of
free travel, booking on the next available ﬂight, and perhaps food or hotel vouchers) until
the requisite number of volunteers are obtained. In about 90% of the cases, this solves
the problem.44 In the remaining cases, passengers are to be boarded in order of check-in
times, and those involuntarily denied boarding are awarded compensation determined by
the regulation.45 In 2007, the risk a passenger faced of being involuntarily “bumped” was
about 1 in 10,000, so it appears that this is not a signiﬁcant quality issue.
5. Travel time and delays: One of the most contentious issues in the deregulated airline
environment has been increased travel time, particularly due to congestion and delays.
Substantial increases in ﬂight operations (see Figures 1 and 11), with limited increases
in infrastructure capacity and few changes in infrastructure deployment, have led to dra-
matic increases in congestion at key points in the aviation system. This has not only
increased scheduled travel time in many markets, but increased mean delay beyond sched-
uled travel time and increased uncertainty around expected arrival times. The Bureau of
Transportation Statistics On-Time performance database reports that in 1988 (the ﬁrst
full year of statistics), roughly 20% of all ﬂights arrived more than 15 minutes after their
scheduled arrival (including cancellations). Despite increasingly “padded” scheduled ﬂight
times, this had increased to 27% in 2000,46 w h e nﬂ i g h td e l a y sa ts o m ea i r p o r t sr e a c h e d
unprecedented levels. While there was some improvement in delays following the reduction
in demand after 9/11, the Bureau of Transport Statistics reported that 28% of ﬂights were
delayed or canceled during 2007, the worst recorded performance since the Department of
Transportation began collecting these data.
Flight delays have numerous causes. Some disruptions, such as severe weather, are
beyond an airline’s or airport’s direct control (though the magnitude and severity may be
aﬀected by an airline’s scheduling policies and availability, or lack, of redundant equipment
and personnel). Incentives to set schedules based on favorable, or even average, conditions
(Mayer and Sinai, 2003) make some delays inevitable. The existence of delays at hub air-
ports, where congestion externalities for the dominant carrier are relatively small, suggests
that airlines may optimize their networks with some expected delay built in (Mayer and
Sinai, 2003). But a signiﬁcant portion of delays appear due to ineﬃcient infrastructure
investment and utilization policies, as we discuss in Section IV.
286. Safety and Security: The level of airline safety has been a focus of government policy
since the infancy of the industry, when Post Oﬃce airmail contracts were shifted from
military aircraft to civilian contractors after a series of fatal accidents involving military
pilots. Despite economic deregulation, the Federal Aviation Administration has main-
tained authority over all aspects of air carrier safety, from certiﬁcation of new aircraft, to
airline maintenance, training, and operating procedures, to airport and air traﬃc control
system operation. Even though safety regulation was not reduced, some opponents to the
Airline Deregulation Act warned that the competitive pressures resulting from economic
deregulation would reduce the level of safety provided by commercial airlines. Economic
theory is not dispositive on whether such an eﬀect would be expected (Rose, 1990).
There is no evidence that airlines have reduced their provision of safety since deregu-
lation. While research ﬁnds some evidence that carriers’ safety records may be inﬂuenced
by their ﬁnancial condition, particularly for smaller airlines (Rose, 1990; and Dionne et.
al., 1997), and Kennet (1993) ﬁnds that engine maintenance cycles lengthened somewhat
after deregulation, economic analyses do not suggest lower levels of safety following dereg-
ulation. This is consistent with a range of other work, and with continuing declines in
overall and fatal accident rates for U.S. commercial airlines (see also Oster, Strong, and
Zorn, 1992; Rose, 1992; and Savage, 1999). This is not terribly surprising. Not only does
safety continue to be directly regulated, but airlines also perceive strong safety reputations
to be a prerequisite to attracting any passengers. The impact on carriers, such as ValuJet,
who fail to maintain such reputations lends some credence to that view.47
Since 2001, there has been an increased emphasis on securing air travel against terrorist
attack. Passenger screening that was ﬁrst introduced in the 1970s in response to aircraft
highjackings was shown to be inadequate, so security measures were stepped up. There
have been no further attacks since 2001, but there have been reports by the U.S. and U.K.
governments of interrupted plans to stage attacks. The screening raises the cost of travel,
discouraging people from traveling by air. Using cross-airport variation in implementation
dates of security changes, Blalock, Kadiyali and Simon (forthcoming) estimate that the
hassle of increased passenger screening after September 11, 2001 reduced demand by about
six percent overall and by nine percent at the nation’s 50 busiest airports.
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The development of the airline industry outside the U.S. diﬀered in two signiﬁcant
ways from the description above. First, with relatively few exceptions, non-U.S. carriers’
fortunes were substantially dependent upon international routes due to their relatively
small domestic markets: for example, international traﬃc accounted for 90% of major Eu-
ropean carrier traﬃc in the 1970s, compared to 28% for comparable U.S. carriers (Good,
Roller, and Sickles, 1993). The terms of competition in international markets have been
governed by negotiated bilateral treaties that generally limited rivalry and often encouraged
collusive behavior, as discussed in greater detail below. Second, while the U.S. industry
was characterized by privately-owned ﬁrms subject to government regulation, the norm
elsewhere was one or two scheduled passenger service “ﬂag carriers, ” operated as entirely
or majority state-owned enterprises. Many of these received signiﬁcant continuing state
subsidies.48 This combination of protected markets, state ownership, and soft budget con-
straints created a tendency toward high costs of service and high fare levels, particularly
relative to comparable U.S. routes in the aftermath of their deregulation. Estimates of
these eﬀects suggest that they were substantial. Cost and production function-based es-
timates suggest relative ineﬃciencies of 15% to 25% of U.S. carrier costs (e.g., ,G o o d ,
Roller, and Sickles, 1993; Ng and Seabright, 2001). Much of this appears linked to labor
costs in a manner strongly suggestive of rent-sharing. Neven, Roller and Zhang (2006)
estimate a model that explicitly endogenizes wage costs through union negotiations, and
conclude that labor cost inﬂation ultimately led to average prices close to monopoly levels
despite non-cooperative mark-up behavior given those higher costs.
Despite these ineﬃciencies, the movement toward more market-based airline sectors
considerably lagged U.S. reforms. This cannot be attributed entirely to the need for inter-
national coordination. There was little progress even on actions requiring no coordination,
such as privatization of airline ownership and relaxation of entry restrictions to reduce
monopoly, until the mid-1980s or later. For example, Swiss Air was the only European
ﬂag carrier with no state ownership until the decision to privatize British Airways in late
1986. While entirely state-owned carriers have become less common today, many govern-
ments continue to have signiﬁcant ownership shares in their national airlines. Similarly,
even among countries large enough to have potentially signiﬁcant domestic markets, com-
petitive restraints remained the norm through the 1980s. In Australia–home to one of
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domestic duopoly between state-owned Trans Australian Airlines (TAA) and privately-
owned Ansett Australian National Airlines (Davies, 1971, 1977) was not relaxed until
1990. Qantas, Australia’s state-owned international ﬂag carrier and, with the purchase of
TAA in 1992, domestic carrier, was not fully privatized until 1995 (see Forsyth, 2003, for
a discussion of the post-deregulation Australian experience).
In international markets, the need for government renegotiation of changes in air ser-
vice agreements added further constraints on the pace of deregulation. The framework,
but not terms, of international air service agreements were established with the 1944 In-
ternational Convention on Civil Aviation, referred to as the “Chicago Convention” for its
location. Despite some early pressure for multilateral agreements, the framework adopted
focused on bilateral negotiations. The Convention enunciated the possible “Freedoms of
the Air” to be granted commercial carriers, which were expanded over time to include nine
possible “Freedoms”. The ﬁrst two were by default granted to all signatory states, and
provided for the right to ﬂy over another country without landing, and to land without
picking up or discharging passengers. The Third and Fourth Freedoms, which comprised
the core of bilateral agreements, provided for rights to transport traﬃc between a carrier’s
home country and an airport in the second country. Fifth and Sixth Freedoms involve ex-
tensions of service to a third country through continuing or connecting service, respectively.
Seventh Freedoms permit international service between two countries entirely outside an
airline’s home country; Eighth and Ninth Freedoms permit an airline to oﬀer domestic
service within a country other than its home country, either as a ﬂight continuation from
its home country (Eighth) or as an independent service (Ninth, also referred to a “pure
cabotage.”).49
Over the ﬁrst three decades following the Chicago Convention, most air services agree-
ments followed the traditional form set out in the US-UK 1946 “Bermuda I” agreement.
These agreements generally restricted international scheduled passenger service to one
designated carrier from each country providing service on a limited set of speciﬁed airport-
routes between the countries. Fares required approval from each government, though this
approval usually was automatic for fares set by the participant airlines under the auspices
of the International Air Transport Association (IATA, the international airline trade as-
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carriers. Capacity limits and revenue-sharing agreements were common, ensuring that
neither country’s airline had the ability or incentive to dominate passenger ﬂows on the
routes.50 The result was little or no competition and high fares on most international
routes. Traﬃc was limited not only by high fares, but also by passenger diversion. The
Convention focused on regulation of scheduled passenger air service; nonscheduled charter
or tour operators took advantage of the regulatory breach to expand their operations, par-
ticularly in markets with signiﬁcant potential leisure traﬃc. This resulted in substantial
passenger shifts away from scheduled passenger airlines in many markets: for example,
by 1977, 29% of the North Atlantic market passengers ﬂew on charter or non-scheduled
services (Doganis, 2006, p. 31).
Liberalization of international agreements began in the late 1970s (see Doganis, 2006).
The ﬁrst major shift was toward “open market” agreements, modeled after the 1978 U.S.
- Netherlands agreement. These introduced greater ﬂexibility into air service–the most
liberal eliminated capacity and service restrictions, allowed each country to designate mul-
tiple airlines for international service, facilitated more competitive pricing, and expanded
the set of airport-routes ﬂown between the two countries. They fell far short of transform-
ing international travel in the way the 1978 U.S. Airline Deregulation Act transformed
the U.S. domestic airline market, however. Entry and pricing ﬂexibility were expanded,
but not competitively determined. Bilateral agreements ignored the fundamental network
aspect of air travel, impeding eﬃcient network operation. Implementation for agreements
that involved the U.S. was asymmetric: for example, while U.S. airlines might be granted
access to all airports in the foreign country, foreign carriers were restricted to a relatively
small set of U.S. gateway cities, generally defended by arguing that the large U.S. airline
market was not matched by similar opportunities abroad. The emphases tended to be
more on the welfare of each country’s carriers than the welfare of consumers.
A second shift, to “open skies” agreements in the 1990s, further reduced government
impediments to competition in selected international markets. The U.S. - Netherlands
1992 agreement was the ﬁrst to mark the transition. This and other “open skies” agree-
ments allowed unlimited market access on all routes between the two countries for all
carriers designated by either country, as well as unlimited Fifth Freedom rights, com-
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between carriers. Even open skies agreements typically were negotiated on bilateral basis,
however.51
The most dramatic transformation in international air service took place in Europe.
By the mid-1980s, the U.K. had begun to negotiate more ﬂexible intra-European bilateral
agreements, and several other European countries followed suit. These were similar to
the agreements the U.S. had signed with many countries, which the U.K. had heretofore
r e j e c t e d ,a n dc o n t i n u e dt or e j e c ti nn e g o t i a t i o n sw i t ht h eU . S .T h i s ,w i t ht h em o v e m e n t
toward integration of the European Community, led to three successive airline liberaliza-
tion packages in Europe in 1987, 1990, and 1992. While the early reforms were modest, the
full implementation of the ﬁnal package in 1997 was as revolutionary for international air
travel within Europe as the 1978 Airline Deregulation Act was for domestic U.S. air travel.
This comprehensive multilateral agreement created a single, largely unregulated airline
market throughout the 25 European Union (EU) member states, Switzerland, Norway,
and Iceland, roughly commensurate with the U.S. domestic market in passenger volume.
It allows full and open access to any routes by any EU carrier (Eighth and Ninth Free-
doms), eliminates price controls, sharply constrains state subsidies, and replaces national
ownership restrictions with liberal EU-wide ownership requirement (allowing up to 49%
ownership by foreign nationals outside the EU, and any ownership patterns by EU member
state nationals).
These reforms have led to a substantial increase in entry by “no frills” (primarily
point-to-point) carriers, though two no-frills carriers, Ryanair and easyJet, account for
more than half of their segment’s total traﬃc. The Association of European Airlines
(AEA) reported that by the summer of 2006, AEA members (primarily “full service” or
network carriers) accounted for 56% of weekly seat capacity; no-frills carriers accounted
for 18%, and other carriers (primarily charter and tour operators) accounted for 26%. This
average masks much greater no-frills shares in markets with an endpoint in the UK (close
to 50%) and lower shares (less than 15%) in remaining intra-EU markets. These carriers
tend to operate out of satellite or regional airports, providing regional or city-pair, but not
airport-pair, competition.
The EU “Third Package” goes far beyond the largely bilateral “open skies” agreements
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more fully deregulated international aviation markets. As dramatic as these changes have
been, however, their impact has been moderated by continuing constraints. Many of the
largest EU airports have capacity constraints that limit or preclude entry at the airport
level, protecting incumbent carriers through administrative rules for allocating access (see
Odoni, 2006) and constraining direct competition. Reaching the full potential of relaxed
ownership restrictions was also severely impeded by the continued governance of extra-
EU international service by bilateral agreements between individual countries: service
between the U.S. and France was limited to French- and American-owned carriers, service
between Japan and the U.K. to Japanese- and British-owned carriers, etc. Carriers that
consolidated across national boundaries within the EU risked losing access to lucrative
international markets outside the EU. This ensured that the EU carrier network remained
more fragmented than might be expected in equilibrium.
Eliminating these restrictions has been a key objective of ongoing EU-wide negoti-
ation of air service agreements with non-EU countries. At the top of the EU agenda is
replacing bilateral agreements between its member states and non-EU countries with mul-
tilateral open skies agreements. Renegotiation of these agreements was eﬀectively forced
by a 2002 European Court of Justice decision invalidating substantial portions of bilateral
agreements. The Court objected on two key grounds: ﬁrst, that the agreements concerned
some terms that were in the purview of the EU not the member states to negotiate, and
second, that they discriminated across EU airlines based on the nationality of their own-
ership, violating Article 43 of the European Community Treaty. Over the past several
years, it has become the EU pushing for greater deregulation, and the U.S. dragging its
heels. EU negotiators have targeted relaxation of the U.S. statutory limit of 25% foreign
ownership of U.S. domestic airlines, nondiscriminatory access to U.S.- EU markets for any
EU carrier, and relaxation of the U.S. government “Fly America” policy. U.S. negotiators
insisted on greater U.S. carrier access to London’s Heathrow airport (the existing U.S.-UK
bilateral agreement restricted U.S. carrier access to Heathrow to United and American
airlines), and had been unable to deliver prospective Congressional approval of a number
of EU demands–most notably relaxation of ownership restrictions.52 A ﬁrst-stage agree-
ment that moves partway toward these goals was approved in 2007, with implementation
eﬀective in the spring of 2008. This expanded access to Heathrow airport, allowed EU-
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ship, and waived nationality clauses for EU ownership of airlines in 28 designated non-EU
countries (primarily African). Negotiations continue on greater liberalization.
Despite liberalization of many international aviation agreements over time–incre-
mentally with the push toward “open skies” bilateral agreements and most signiﬁcantly
with the transformation of European Union markets over the past ten years–competition
in many international markets continues to be limited, encouraging higher prices and rent-
seeking activities.53 Protection of domestically-owned carriers through ownership restric-
tions that preclude foreign acquisitions or mergers and continuing prohibitions on cabotage
(international or domestic service that lies entirely outside a carrier’s home country) pre-
serve ineﬃciencies and reduce the beneﬁts of competitive markets. There continues to be
a considerable distance between current policy and a competitive international aviation
market.
IV. Continuing Issues in the Deregulated Airline Industry
Airline deregulation has likely beneﬁted consumers with lower average prices, more
extensive and frequent service, and continued technological progress in both aircraft and
ticketing. The industry continues to attract considerable attention from economists and
policy makers, however, in part because its business practices have been so dynamic and
diﬀerentiated across ﬁrms while airline earnings have been tremendously volatile. If the
fundamental question of industrial organization is the degree to which unfettered markets
achieve eﬃcient production and allocation of outputs, and the extent to which government
intervention can improve such eﬃciencies, the airline industry may illustrate those issues
as well as any.
After more than a quarter-century of experience with airline deregulation, some ob-
servers continue to call for renewed government intervention in the economic decision-
making of the industry. The concerns divide somewhat imperfectly into three areas. First,
is the current organization of the industry economically sustainable? U.S. airlines have lost
billions of dollars during demand downturns that occurred at the beginning of the 1980s
and 1990s, and during 2001-2005. Do these losses indicate that fundamental change in the
organization of the industry–e.g., to a tight oligopoly–is necessary before the sellers will
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the losses the result of investor exuberance and management weakness that led to excess
capital and inﬂated costs during high-demand periods, setting the companies up for ex-
treme earnings downturns when demand weakens? Put diﬀerently, will ﬁrms’ self-control
of capacity and labor cost growth during good times be enough to reduce the cyclicality
of the industry, or is the instability of this industry fundamentally diﬀerent from most
others?
Second, should market power be a signiﬁcant public policy concern in this industry?
Mergers and use of loyalty programs may raise barriers to entry by new ﬁrms and barri-
ers to market expansion by existing ﬁrms, but how large are these eﬀects, and can they
be moderated through application of antitrust policy? Does the poor earnings record of
the airlines demonstrate that market power is not a signiﬁcant issue? Conversely, does
the enormous apparent cost advantage of smaller airlines–which still have only about
one-quarter of the U.S. market–indicate just the opposite, that the market power of in-
cumbents has allowed them to impede the loss of market share to much more eﬃcient
rivals. If this is the case, then the market power may create not only the usual static dead-
weight loss from underconsumption, but also production deadweight loss from exclusion
of a more eﬃcient ﬁrm.
Finally, much of the air travel infrastructure remains in government hands, and there
remain questions about the eﬃciency of the interaction between government resources,
including airport facilities and air traﬃc control, and the private air transport sector.
Congestion and delays soared prior to the collapse of traﬃc following 9/11, and re-emerged
as critical issues with the return of passenger volume in 2006 and 2007 and exacerbated
by the growth of smaller aircraft such as regional jets in many markets. These suggest
that government-run airport and air traﬃc control systems may have lagged behind the
industry’s dramatic expansion since deregulation. Are the government-controlled support
activities well-coordinated with the private sector? Is imperfect coordination leading to
signiﬁcant ineﬃciencies in the industry? And, would privatization of these government
services be likely to improve performance?
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Airline nominal net proﬁts over the post-deregulation period have ﬂuctuated wildly,
with a high of nearly $5.4 billion in net income in 1999 and a low of over $11 billion
in net losses in 2002. From observations like “the U.S. airline industry lost more money
in 2002 than it had made in its entire history, ”54 two diﬀerent, but related, theories
have been argued to show that competition in the airline industry is not sustainable.
These are versions of the “destructive competition” concerns that were raised in early
discussions of the need for airline regulation in the 1920s and 1930s. Their basic idea
is that unconstrained competition leads to prices too low to sustain viable ﬁrms. The
outcome may be evolution into a monopoly or tight oligopoly, though supranormal proﬁts
associated with this structure may then set oﬀ another round of “excessive” investment
and competition.
The ﬁrst theory tends to be popular with the media and with some industry lobbyists
pursuing a regulatory-relief or tax-relief agenda. Proponents of this theory note that
the airline industry has substantial ﬁxed costs and very speciﬁc assets used to produce a
homogeneous good, and at the same time is subject to highly cyclical demand and frequent
shocks to variable cost. In such an unregulated environment, it is argued, boom/bust cycles
are inevitable and will lead to underinvestment, or, in the extreme, a complete collapse of
funding for the industry.
While the description of industry-speciﬁc ﬁxed costs and cyclical demand is reason-
ably accurate, it should be noted these are not unique to airlines. Moreover, the con-
clusion of inevitable collapse is diﬃcult to reconcile with the history of this industry, or
that of other capital-intensive industries that face unpredictable demand. Like those in
other industries–steel, autos, semiconductors, oil reﬁning, and telecommunications among
others–airline earnings are likely to be volatile, which can lead to bankruptcies. With
long-lived industry-speciﬁc capital, failures tend to change the identity of its owners with
little eﬀect on the overall capital stock. This can depress returns for extended periods of
time, as occurred in oil reﬁning for most of the 1980s and 1990s and in telecommunications
infrastructure in the early 2000s.
These conditions present a problem in the economic or industrial organization sense
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industry. In the airline industry, however, inadequate industry investment is virtually never
mentioned as a problem. Over the last three decades, the far more frequent complaint from
the airlines and industry analysts has been that there has been too much capital pouring
into the industry; this complaint often is accompanied by a plea from the industry to limit
entry and expansion in order to “rationalize” capacity and ensure adequate returns to
investment.
The second theory appeals to the existence of scope and network economies in produc-
tion of air transportation. Proponents argue that the eﬃcient conﬁguration of production
implied by these economies suggests that the number of viable ﬁrms may be quite small
in equilibrium. A nuanced version argues that there may be an “empty core” to the com-
petitive game, if, for example, costs of producing a large set of air travel services among
many cities are lowest if provided by one ﬁrm, but costs are not locally sub-additive. That
is, if subsets of those routes could be served at a cost below the incumbent’s fares, an
entrant serving just those routes could be proﬁtable while rendering the reduced system
of the incumbent unproﬁtable. The entrant’s set of city-pair markets might, in turn, be
vulnerable to further attack by entrants serving other subsets of markets, leaving groups of
markets that are not breakeven on a standalone basis.55 Periodic upheavals in the industry
might follow the breakdowns and reforming of coalitions.
There is little empirical support for either an empty core or natural monopoly char-
acterization of the airline industry. There is widespread agreement among researchers and
industry participants that economies of scale and passenger density may exist, but empir-
ical estimates of their magnitude have found fairly modest advantages of size. Returns to
density in airline networks typically have been estimated as the change in total cost of in-
creasing passenger traﬃc (e.g. passenger-miles) while holding constant network size (e.g.,
airports or routes served) and structure (e.g., average stage length). Estimated elasticities
of total cost with respect to density tend to cluster around 0.85.56 That is, doubling pas-
senger traﬃc on a given network reduces average costs by roughly 15%. Estimated returns
to scale, generally measured by the increase in expected costs from doubling output and
network size, tend to be roughly constant at the scale of major airlines. Moreover, across
major U.S. airlines, there seems to be little correlation between overall size of operations
38and unit cost, though it is quite diﬃcult to adjust such calculations for quality and the
diﬀerent array of products oﬀered. After more than 25 years, there is no evidence that cost
advantages are giving the largest airlines increasingly dominant positions, as indicated by
ﬁgures 6 (costs) and 7 (market share).
We would note, moreover, that complaints of inadequate returns on investment are not
unique to the deregulated environment, nor to the airline industry. Prior to 1978, regula-
tors faced ongoing claims of proﬁt inadequacy, although economic analyses suggested that
returns generally covered the industry’s cost of capital (Caves, 1962) and that attempts to
increase returns through higher fares generally led to increased capacity investment rather
than to increased proﬁtability (Douglas and Miller, 1974a, b). While it is true that the level
of proﬁts in current dollars exhibits substantially greater ﬂuctuations post-deregulation,
this is to be expected given price inﬂation and the rapid increase in the overall scale of
the industry. Figure 12 adjusts for both of these factors, scaling industry aggregate con-
stant dollar net income by available seat-mile and by revenue passenger-mile from 1960 to
2007.57 Cyclicality in net income is neither new nor particularly more pronounced since
deregulation.
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Two classes of explanations go a long ways towards explaining the volatility in the
industry. First, the fundamental economics of the industry–volatile demand, high ﬁxed
costs, and slow supply adjustment–combine to create an environment in which proﬁts
are likely to be change quickly and drastically. Second, the industry has undergone and
continues to undergo a very high level of business-model experimentation, in pricing, logis-
tics, competitive strategies, and organizational form. With companies still quite uncertain
about major aspects of operations and market interactions, it wouldn’t be surprising that
signiﬁcant strategic errors and successes occur with negative and positive proﬁt impacts.
We consider these two areas in turn.
1. Market Fundamentals: The ﬁrst factor contributing to earnings volatility is volatile de-
mand. To illustrate the demand volatility carrier’s face, suppose airline demand reﬂected
only proportional shifts in an otherwise unchanging constant elasticity demand curve. For
a given elasticity,  , we can associate observed quantities (measured by aggregate domestic
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enue passenger-mile) with a demand curve of the form ln(Q)=α +   · ln(P). Shifts in α
needed to keep observed price and quantity pairs on a demand curve can be interpreted as
demand shifts. Figure 13 illustrates the resulting implied domestic demand shifts (changes
in a normalized α) over 1960-2007, for assumed constant demand elasticities of -0.8, -1.0
and -1.2.58 These are broadly within the range of industry short-run demand elasticity
estimates in the literature.59 While somewhat artiﬁcial, this captures the rapid demand
changes that occurred, not just following the September 11, 2001 attacks, but also around
the recessions of the early 1980s and 1990s and at other times. Figure 14 presents the
year-to-year changes in α for the mid-elasticity case of -1. The implied demand changes
are quite substantial and volatile. In the early 1980s, for instance, 9% growth in demand
one year reverted to an 6% decline just two years later and back to 9% growth two years
after that. Volatility of demand is, of course, especially challenging for producers when
the good is not storable and production is characterized by strict short-run production
constraints, as in the case with air travel.60
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Volatility in demand creates even greater earnings volatility if ﬁrms are not able to
resize production quickly, reducing inputs and costs when demand slackens and expanding
rapidly when demand picks up. Fixed capital costs make this diﬃcult in the airline in-
dustry, but capital costs (lease, depreciation and amortization costs for aircraft and other
capital) averaged only 15% of total costs from 1990 to 2007. These capital costs are actu-
ally not ﬁxed in the usual economic sense. There are active resale markets for aircraft and
other equipment, and the transaction costs are considered to be low. But their economic
value ﬂuctuates with demand and is highly correlated across ﬁrms. Moreover, ﬁnancially
distressed ﬁrms may be disadvantaged in “forced” asset sales; see Pulvino (1998). So, for
instance, a carrier cannot generally recoup the original cost of an aircraft by selling the
plane when it faces a demand downturn. In economic terms, the demand downturn creates
a capital loss for the carrier because it is holding aircraft at the time the value of aircraft
has declined. In accounting terms–which drive reported proﬁts–the ﬁrm continues to
recognize the ﬁnancing cost and depreciation of the asset each year. Thus, for instance, a
huge capital loss that carriers incurred from holding aircraft on September 11, 2001 showed
40up in accounting terms through depreciation of the original aircraft cost over the ensuing
years.
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Labor costs (wage and beneﬁts) are a much larger cost factor for airlines, averaging
35% of total airline operating costs between 1990 and 2007. Figure 15 reproduces the
implied domestic demand changes from ﬁgure 14 for 1989-2007 and adds changes in labor
costs (comparable data are not available for earlier years). Changes in labor cost, total
wage and beneﬁts bill, are clearly much smoother than demand changes. This demonstrates
a fundamental cause of earnings volatility in the airline industry: Not just capital costs,
but also labor costs, are slow to respond to demand changes.
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Labor agreements in this industry generally cover both the compensation and work
rules. While labor costs generally are thought of as variable costs, in the highly-unionized
airline industry, they are certainly not easily or quickly changed. They are not accurately
characterized as ﬁxed costs either, however. Typically, the quantity of a ﬁxed input can
only be changed with a lag, but its purchase price is set exogenously. From statements by
both airlines and labor, it is clear that wages of pilots and other high-skilled workers are
endogenous to air travel demand and, it appears, to airline proﬁts; see Hirsch (2006) and
Neven, Roller, and Zhang (2006). Changes in an airline’s ﬁnancial health aﬀect both the
quantity of the semi-ﬁxed input it wants to buy and the wage it pays.
Labor relations in this industry are somewhat more complex than in most others,
both because of the specialized skills and government safety certiﬁcation required of some
workers and because of the non-storability of the good. The former implies that input
substitutes for highly skilled workers may not be available on short notice.61 The latter
makes labor actions particularly costly to the airlines in terms of both lost business and
reputation damage.
The power of the airline workforce has made it a quasi-shareholder in the airlines. Dur-
ing high-proﬁt periods, labor has been able to negotiate attractive compensation packages,
while periods of sustained losses often lead to negotiated reductions. Changes in compen-
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pattern at many legacy carriers:62 An airline’s earnings decline, whether from adverse in-
dustry shocks or competitive disadvantages unique to the ﬁrm. The airline may pursue
cost-saving initiatives, but labor is by the largest cost category, and the second largest,
fuel, is priced exogenously. Management therefore claims that it needs concessions from
labor to remain viable. Labor unions are resistant to wage or beneﬁt cuts, or restructuring
of work rules; they express skepticism about the airline’s ﬁnancial diﬃculty and blame
losses on poor management. If the ﬁnancial distress of the carrier continues, labor is faced
with the possibility of carrier bankruptcy–which brings the bankruptcy court into the
labor negotiations with its powers to impose wage and work-rule changes, merger into a
stronger airline, or even possible liquidation of the company. Generally, at this point, labor
representatives become more accommodating and some sort of compensation reduction is
agreed to. Between 2002 and 2005, however, USAir, United, Northwest and Delta each
entered bankruptcy even after negotiating signiﬁcant compensation reductions and then
proceeded to negotiate for further givebacks.
Similarly, during strong ﬁnancial periods, labor attempts to extract some of the proﬁts.
Multi-year collective bargaining agreements, however, mean that airlines can have extended
periods of high earnings before the pressure to distribute some of those proﬁts to labor
alters wages. In both cases, the wage bill stickiness means that labor cost changes may
out of sync with proﬁt changes, exacerbating the proﬁt swings.
Among the costs that contribute to earnings volatility, fuel cost is probably the one
that has received the most attention in the press and policy discussions. The exogenous
price of jet fuel can been very volatile: from 1990 to 2007, fuel costs averaged 15% of
total operating expenses, but varied from 11% to 25%, and was over 30% for the ﬁrst half
of 2008.63 Airlines can make incremental operating changes to aﬀect the amount of fuel
they use for a given ﬂight schedule–ﬂying at slower speeds and using their most fuel-
eﬃcient aircraft–but their fuel cost per available seat-mile is driven primarily by oil price
ﬂuctuations. Fuel price volatility can be large and is only somewhat correlated with the
demand that the airlines face. Figure 16 shows the annual change in fuel cost per available
seat-mile (ASM). Note that the scale is diﬀerent from the previous two graphs.
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42As in nearly all other industries, producers complain that they are unable to pass
along energy price increases as quickly as they would like. The production technology of
the airline industry explains some of the diﬃculty in this case. For a given ﬂight schedule,
the increase in fuel consumption from carrying an additional passenger is quite small, 64
so fuel is close to a ﬁxed cost until the carrier is willing to change the number of ﬂights
it oﬀers. If the industry were to adjust rapidly to fuel cost changes, the number of ﬂights
would decline and load factors would likely rise whenever fuel prices increased. Airlines
are reluctant to make rapid schedule reductions in response to fuel price increases, in
part for logistical reasons–it requires complex rescheduling of all the carrier’s aircraft
and rebooking of passengers who have already bought tickets–and in part for competitive
strategic reasons–concern that a reduced schedule will make them less attractive relative
to competitors.65 Empirically, it is hard to see any tendency towards adjustments in ca-
pacity ﬂown or load factors in response to fuel price shocks during the post-deregulation
data.
Figure 17 shows the implied demand next to the changes in output sold, measured
by revenue passenger-miles, and capacity, measured by available seat-miles. This indicates
some degree of short-run supply inelasticity; perfectly elastic supply would result in no
price adjustment and quantity that would change by the full demand shift. Reductions
in demand do not trigger equally large reductions in input costs; instead, price adjusts
downward in the short run, so quantity falls less than the demand shift.
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In addition, the common perception that planes ﬂy very full when demand is strong
and mostly empty when demand weakens is not supported by the data. The lowest line on
the left side in ﬁgure 17 (utilizing the right-hand axis) shows the load factor, the proportion
of seats ﬁlled.66 Load factor does not seem to be aﬀected much at all by demand shocks;
even in 2002, the domestic average load factor was 70%, the same as in 1998 and just
one percentage point lower than in 2000. None of the major post-deregulation demand
downturns–1982, 1991, or 2001-02–was accompanied by a signiﬁcant drop in load factors.
This suggests that airlines have managed their capacity and prices to keep the proportion
of seats ﬁlled roughly constant in the presence of demand shocks. Fuel price shocks also
don’t seem to drive load factors: large fuel cost increases in 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2005 are
43not associated with unusual load factor increases and the plunge in 1986 and somewhat
smaller drop in 1999 do not seem to have driven load factors down. Over the deregulation
years, however, there has been a clear trend towards higher load factors.67
The demand shock following September 11, 2001 illustrates the dynamic of the in-
teraction between demand, supply and costs that causes earning in the industry to be so
volatile. Between 2000 and 2002, demand fell 26% (using an assumed -1 price elasticity),
real price fell 17%, output (RPMs) fell 6%, capacity (ASMs) fell 5%, and load factor de-
clined from 71% to 70%. Real labor expenses declined only 2%. Yet, over the following
four years, real labor expenses declined 28% while demand grew 13%.
While these data suggest that volatile demand, sticky labor and capital costs, and
ﬂuctuating fuel costs all contribute to volatile earnings, it is hard to know the magnitude
of these eﬀects from the discussion thus far. In an attempt to calibrate the eﬀects of these
factors on proﬁts, we have created a fairly simple model of airline proﬁts that attempts to
capture these factors and roughly gauge the size of their impacts on earnings. 68
We start from the recognition that if production were constant returns to scale even in
the short run, if all cost changes were fully and immediately passed through to price, and if
all demand shifts were absorbed completely by quantity changes with no price adjustment,
then earnings per customer (or, more precisely, earnings per revenue passenger-mile) would
not vary. Then we introduce (a) some ﬁxed component to costs, (b) the actual fuel price
volatility and the assumption that it is only partially absorbed in price adjustment, and
(c) short run adjustments to demand shifts that are partially in quantity and partially in
price.
We examine data for the entire domestic U.S. airline industry for 1990-2007. We ﬁrst
calculate “low volatility” earnings, assuming airline costs per unit output, load factors, and
prices are constant at their mean (in real terms) over this period. In this case, earnings
ﬂuctuations would be due entirely to shifts in demand that would shift earnings by exactly
the same proportion.
The nearly ﬂat line with hollow diamonds in ﬁgure 18 represents this ﬂuctuation. The
large demand ﬂuctuations we discussed above are, not surprisingly, dwarfed by the actual
ﬂuctuations in industry operating proﬁts, which are represented by the line with dark
44squares.
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We then make a set of assumptions of incomplete industry adjustment. We assume
that in any one year, as demand growth and fuel costs deviate from their average over this
16 year period, carriers can only adjust incompletely. In particular, only 50% of deviations
from mean fuel cost are passed along through price changes. Similarly, when demand
growth deviates from its mean level, quantity changes by only 30% of the horizontal demand
diﬀerence between the expected and actual demand shift. The remainder of the shift is
absorbed by price adjustment, as would be the case with short-run supply inelasticity,
regardless of whether it is due to steep marginal costs, concerns about competitive position,
or some sort of oligopoly adjustment process. We also assume that costs are not completely
ﬂexible. Of the non-fuel costs, we assume that 30% are ﬁxed with respect to passengers
or ﬂights. We assume 20% are proportional to passengers (RPMs), and the remaining
50% are proportional to ﬂights (ASMs). Finally, we assume that ﬂight schedules adjust
nearly, but not quite completely to changes in passengers, i.e., that deviations from mean
quantity are associated with a 90% deviation from mean capacity in the same direction,
so load factor exhibits minimal variation.
We don’t claim that these assumptions are precisely accurate, but we would argue that
they are plausible in the context of the airline industry. The model also doesn’t capture any
serial correlation due to lagged adjustment, as opposed to just the partial adjustment from
mean levels that we model here. And the model ignores the endogeneity of input prices,
such as labor. Nonetheless, even this simple model of partial adjustment to demand and
cost shocks generates earnings volatility–represented by the line with hollow triangles–
that is nearly the magnitude we have observed in the industry over the last decade and a
half. The point is not that this is an exact model of the adjustments in the airline industry,
but that demand and fuel cost ﬂuctuations combined with sticky adjustment on the supply
side can easily generate the observed magnitude of earnings volatility, without any appeal
to “empty core” or destructive competition arguments.
2. Innovation: While the airline industry has more than a quarter-century of experience
in a deregulated environment, it would be a mistake to assume that ﬁrms have had that
45much time to adjust to a new but stable business environment. Technological innovation in
this industry has been relatively slow compared to telecommunications, electronics, media
or a number of other industries, but the post-deregulation airline industry has been one of
the leaders in experimentation with alternative production processes, pricing models, and
organizational forms. It takes time to determine the success of a given experiment, and as
one would expect, some of the experiments have not been successful.
– Network conﬁguration: The hub-and-spoke network is probably the best-known innova-
tion attributed to airline deregulation. Though hubs existed prior to deregulation, their use
expanded tremendously in the immediate aftermath of deregulation. However, while there
are clear advantages of a hub system due to density economies and demand advantages,
there also are costs, which have become more apparent over time. In the late 1980s, hubs
were thought to be so powerful–both as an eﬃciency enhancement and protection from
aggressive competitors–that a race to develop as many hubs as possible ensued. Many of
the new hubs that airlines set up ultimately proved unproﬁtable and were abandoned.69
Recent developments in the industry, including the consistent proﬁtability of Southwest
Airlines, which does not operate a formal hub system, 70 have raised further questions
about the viability of hub-based airline networks.
After initial focus on cost and competitive advantages of hubs, airlines are growing
more cognizant of their limitations. Hubs may increase aircraft operating costs, particu-
larly when “tightly-banked, ” i.e., when coordinated groups of ﬂights arrive at very close
intervals and then all depart 45 to 75 minutes later. These operations increase delays and
congestion costs and reduce aircraft utilization (see Mayer and Sinai, 2003). As delays
increase, traveler inconvenience and missed connections also increase, reducing passenger
demand (Forbes, 2004). Some airlines have experimented with “de-banking” their hubs or
introducing rolling hubs, in which ﬂight operations are smoothed over the day. For exam-
ple, Figure 19 illustrates the evolution of American Airlines’ hub operations at Dallas-Fort
Worth airport between 2001 and 2003, from the tightly-banked hub schedule ﬁrst devel-
oped during the 1980s to a rolling hub schedule with a smoother pattern of arrivals and
departures. While de-banking hub operations may reduce some of the cost of hubs, rolling
schedules also tend to increase passengers’ expected travel time, reducing their demand
for connecting ﬂights. Further experimentation with network conﬁguration is undoubtedly
46ahead.
INSERT FIGURE 19 HERE
– Pricing and distribution: Many industries have learned from the sophistication airlines
have developed in peak-load pricing, price discrimination, and revenue management. But
the airlines themselves remain uncertain, and often in fundamental disagreement, over
how much price segmentation is optimal and precisely how to accomplish it.71 As shown in
Figure 5, within carrier-route price dispersion peaked in 2001 and has since declined con-
siderably. A decline in business travel beginning in late 2000 and accelerating in early 2001
led to a sharp decline in unrestricted ticket sales. This, combined with the perceived slow
return of high-fare passengers following September 11, 2001, has led many in the industry
to argue that price dispersion has exceeded proﬁt-maximizing levels.72 The unprecedented
gap between unrestricted and discount fares in the late 1990s may have signiﬁcantly altered
purchasing patterns. This may have been exacerbated by changes in airline distribution
methods: the diﬀerence in fares is readily apparent to travelers using online travel search
engines, and travelers with some ﬂexibility in their schedules can take advantage of search
tools that readily provide potential cost savings from small schedule shifts.
Legacy carriers have not only been losing formerly high-fare passengers to restricted
fares on their own networks, but also appear to be losing an increasing fraction of business
travelers to low-cost carriers such as Southwest and Jet Blue, contributing to the increased
market shares of those carriers. This defection is ascribed in part to generally lower
unrestricted, walk-up fares on low-cost carriers, and in part to perceptions that their
service, while no-frills, may be more reliable and consistently on-time, a valuable attribute
for business travelers.73 Many airlines have recently announced dramatic reductions in
unrestricted fares, in an eﬀort to stem this trend. Airlines have also experimented with
changing the kinds of restrictions they impose on discount tickets. The penetration of
Southwest and other low-cost airlines with simpler pricing structures and no Saturday night
stay requirements have led many legacy carriers to drop Saturday night stay restrictions,
at least on competing routes, relying instead only on advanced-purchase requirements
for their discounted fares. Uncertainty about the optimal ticket restrictions and level of
price dispersion surely contributes to the volatility of the airlines operations and ﬁnancial
returns.
47– Organizational form: Perhaps the most important ongoing business innovation in the
airline industry is in organizational form. In the early 1980s, an airline was a stand-alone
entity that sold tickets for travel on the routes it served. During the 1980s, most ma-
jor airlines formed code-sharing partnerships with small commuter airlines providing feed
traﬃc for their hubs. Though strategic alliances have since expanded greatly in number,
geographic scope, and the dimensions of activities on which partners coordinate, their role
remains somewhat unclear. Alliances are not mergers, and most do not have antitrust
clearance to cooperate on pricing. Rather, they are a hybrid organizational form in which
ﬁrms may compete in some markets, while cooperating and jointly selling their product
in other markets. These agreements can be very complex, both to be beneﬁcial to both
partners and to clear antitrust scrutiny; see Brueckner and Whalen (2002), Bamberger,
Carlton, and Neumann (2004), Lederman (2007, 2008), and Forbes and Lederman (2006).74
This certainly is not an exhaustive list of the business changes the industry has seen
since deregulation, but it illustrates how dynamic the airline business model has been
and continues to be. The managerial skills necessary to run an airline are constantly
changing. Airlines continue to experiment with alternative approaches to ﬂight operations
and scheduling, pricing, organizational form, distribution, and many other aspects of the
business. The feedback process is slow and extremely noisy, making it diﬃcult to determine
which experiments are successes and which are failures. These issues are not unique to
airlines, but combined with the demand volatility and cost stickiness discussed earlier,
they suggest that industry volatility in itself is unlikely to indicate a structural need for
renewed government intervention.
B. Market Power Concerns
Attention to market power concerns in the airline industry has waxed and waned
considerably over the post-deregulation period. It heightened during the mid- to late-
1980s, as airline exits and consolidations led to dramatic increases in concentration, and
again in the late 1990s, as proﬁtability soared. Amid the recent ﬁnancial distress of the
industry, concerns about industry concentration and pricing power have abated. While
it may be natural to worry more about market power when proﬁts are high, the proﬁt
level tells us little about its extent. Market power does generally raise proﬁts relative to
the competitive level, though the size of this eﬀect depends in part on the rent extraction
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previous section–volatile demand, sticky costs, and repeated disruptions from business
innovations–it is diﬃcult to know whether airlines are making higher proﬁts than would
be the case if they were simple price takers. With the potential for ineﬃcient production,
labor rent-sharing, and poor or unlucky timing of ﬁxed investment, proﬁt levels shed little
or no light on the degree of market power that airlines present.
At the time of deregulation, it was recognized that most routes might be able to
support only one or two ﬁrms and that market power could be an issue. The theory
of “contestability”–that potential competition would discipline ﬁrms, forcing them to
keep prices at competitive levels in order to deter new entry–was put forth in support
of deregulation.75 Through the 1980s, however, contestability theory as applied to airlines
took repeated blows from studies that found the number of actual competitors signiﬁcantly
aﬀected price levels on a route.76 Potential competition in general had a modest eﬀect
disciplining pricing.77 Fares are markedly higher on routes served by only one airline than
they are on routes with more active competitors, and tend to decline signiﬁcantly with
entry of a second and third competitor. By the end of the 1980s, the theory was seldom
raised in the context of airlines.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the focus of market power analysis expanded to
include airport shares. The basis for this concern, ﬁrst laid out by Levine (1987), was
that an airline could use its dominant position at an airport to deter entry. A number
of economic analyses have found signiﬁcantly higher fare associated with concentration
at the airport level; See Borenstein (1989), Evans and Kessides (1993), and Abramowitz
and Brown (1993). This airport dominance eﬀect may reﬂect the impact of market power
exercised through loyalty rewards programs in which the value of the rewards–to travel
agents, corporations and individuals–increased more than proportionally with the points
earned.78 By inducing travelers to concentrate their business with just one or a few airlines,
these programs make it diﬃcult for a new airline to successfully enter a small subset of
routes at an airport dominated by another carrier. Airport dominance could also impede
entry by giving the incumbent control over scarce gates, ticket counters and, at some
airports, landing slots.
Some airlines and researchers have disputed the existence of a “hub premium, ” argu-
49ing that studies ﬁnding such price diﬀerences across airports fail to control for diﬀerences
in the business/leisure mix of travelers; see Gordon and Jenkins (1999) and Lee and Prado
(2005). The argument, however, has two serious ﬂaws. First, the critique suggests that
a ﬁnding of higher prices in markets with less elastic demand–more business travelers–
should not be attributed to market power. While some have suggested that there are
higher costs in serving business travelers, the magnitude of these cost diﬀerentials cannot
explain the price diﬀerences across airports; see Borenstein (1999). Second, in practice,
most of these studies have determined the share of leisure traﬃc at an airport by examining
the proportion of customers who purchase discount tickets. While a “leisure share” vari-
able constructed as the proportion of passengers paying low fares goes a long way towards
explaining where average prices are lower, this sheds little light on the cause.
It is important to recognize that these patterns do not imply that passengers at
dominated airports are necessarily worse oﬀ. Large airports with one or two dominant
carriers generally are hubs and, as such, schedule a disproportionate number of ﬂights
compared to the local demand for air service. Improved service quality may oﬀset part or
all of the loss from higher prices resulting from airport dominance. Nor do these concerns
necessarily demand regulation. Even if prices are above competitive levels, they may
be no less eﬃcient than are regulated prices. Rather, the relevant question is whether
appropriately executed competition policy could enable customers to receive the beneﬁts
of greater service without having to pay higher fares associated with trips to and from the
hubs.
Some of these concerns may be mooted by recent market developments. Figure 20
illustrates a trend toward convergence in prices across airports that is documented in
Borenstein (2005). One can calculate an average fare premium at an airport in a given
year by comparing the prices paid for trips to/from that airport to national average prices
for all similar distance trips.79 For the average fare premium at the 50 largest airports,
Figure 20 presents 10th, 25th, 75th and 90th percentiles during 1984-2007. Cross-airport
price variation peaked in 1996 and has been declining since. Relative to national average,
most of the most expensive airports have seen prices fall and fares at most of the cheapest
airports have risen. The standard deviation of the fare premium measure across the 50
largest airports has fallen from 23% in 1996 to 13% in 2007. The 2007 level is virtually
50the same level of cross-airport dispersion in fare premia that existed in 1979. Though no
research has yet analyzed the cause of this phenomenon, it seems likely that market power
from airport dominance is declining.
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The decline in fare disparities across airports coincides with the expansion of low-cost
airlines in the U.S. Many low-cost or “no-frills” startup airlines appeared in the 1980s, Peo-
ple Express being the most widely known, only to liquidate before the decade was over.
With the exception of Southwest, they have until recently had diﬃculty gaining suﬃcient
presence to ensure proﬁtability and their continued existence. Southwest appears to have
avoided their fate through relentless attention to employee relations and productivity, care-
ful control over operating costs, and judiciously-paced expansion plans that until recently
avoided head-to-head competition at dominated airports.
There clearly is a signiﬁcant “Southwest eﬀect” in the current airline industry; in
terms of its increased market share, expansion into more markets, and price impact in
markets it serves or may credibly begin to serve (Morrison, 2001). Whether this is unique
to Southwest, and hence non-replicable, or is poised to diﬀuse across other airlines, may be
a signiﬁcant determinant of the future saliency of market power concerns in this industry.
C. Infrastructure Development and Utilization
Airport congestion was not a signiﬁcant issue at most U.S. airports during the reg-
ulated era. Most airports operated well below their technical capacity and it was rare
that air traﬃc controllers were required to impose more than minor delays due to excess
demand for ground or air space. Four airports–National (now Reagan) in Washington,
D.C., La Guardia, and JFK in New York, and O’Hare at Chicago–were subject to signif-
icant excess demand. Under the so-called High Density Rules, the FAA imposed limits on
aggregate hourly operations (take-oﬀs and landings) at these airports. Initially, take-oﬀ
and landing “slots” at these airports were allocated through a negotiation process among
incumbent carriers. As demand grew rapidly after deregulation, the problem of congested
airports worsened substantially. By 2000, fewer than three-quarters of all ﬂights arrived
at their destination airport on-time, deﬁned by the FAA as landing within 15 minutes of
scheduled arrival time.80
51Some operational delays are within the control of air carriers (see e.g., Mayer and
Sinai, 2003). But an increasing share appears linked to inadequate infrastructure in the
airport and air traﬃc control system. The airline industry in the U.S. and throughout the
world, regardless of the degree of economic regulation, relies on an infrastructure that is
largely government-controlled. The U.S. air traﬃc control system, which directs all aircraft
ﬂight operations, is operated by the Federal Aviation Administration. This control extends
to airport runway traﬃc management, but not to the airport facilities. Airport terminals
are managed, and usually owned, by a local government entity, which can be a city, a
county, or a special government entity established purely to oversee an airport. After
September 2001, security at U.S. airports was turned over to the Transportation Security
Administration, an agency within the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
Unfortunately, the track record of these government-controlled components of the air
transport system has not been particularly impressive. A preference, or in some cases,
requirement, for administrative allocation of resources often has trumped any attempts
to understand and employ market incentives in order to improve eﬃciency. Besides slow
adoption of economic innovations that could improve economic welfare, technological in-
novation has also been slow in some areas.
1. Airport access: In 1985, the federal government addressed a small part of the problem
by establishing limited property rights for takeoﬀ and landing clearance at four highly
congested airports. Most of these tradeable “landing slots” were then given to incumbents
based on their prior level of operations at the airports. Some were held out for allocation
to new entrants at below-market prices. A market for these slots has developed and has
supported thousands of trades since the beginning of the program. The slot allocation
program, however, has been extended to only six U.S. airports. Moreover, while this
system has improved the allocation of scarce operational slots at these airports relative to
negotiated allocations, it faces an uncertain future.
In 2000, Congress decided that small communities did not have suﬃcient access to
service at slot-controlled airports, and it enacted legislation (“AIR 21”) to suspend the
High Density Rule (HDR) slot limits. LaGuardia was immediately opened to service
using regional jets. The surge in scheduled service resulted in a 30 percent increase in
operations, to almost 1400 daily, at an airport that was previously ranked as the second-
52most delayed airport in the country. The result was predictable. In September 2000,
one-third of the ﬂights at LaGuardia were delayed, with an average delay of more than
40 minutes. LaGuardia-related delays accounted for one-ﬁfth of all delays in the country
(Maillet, 2000). Forbes (2004) analyzes the eﬀect of these delays on travelers’ willingness
to pay for air travel. The FAA ultimately responded with a cap on total ﬂight operations
per hour and a lottery system to allocate these across carriers. In 2002, landing slots
were to be abolished system-wide. A similar story replayed at Chicago O’Hare airport,
where both American and United substantially increased scheduled service in anticipation
of the elimination of slot constraints, leading once again to egregious delays and imposition
of administrative solutions. A 2008 administration proposal for landing slot auctions for
Laguardia, Kennedy, and Newark airports was met with ﬁerce opposition by the New York
Port Authority and the airlines, and amendments to ban slot auctions were introduced
in Congress. With Congress unwilling to recognize operational constraints, and airport
authorities unable or unwilling to expand physical capacity to meet demand at current
access prices, the future of this system remains uncertain.
The remaining (more than 300) airports that support commercial jet ﬂights operate
under a system known as “ﬂow control, ” which is essentially queuing. Despite the success
of market incentives in other parts of the industry, and growing interest in congestion
pricing applied to some transportation segments, 81 there has been tremendous resistance
to use of congestion pricing to allocate scarce runway capacity. In one case, a plan to use
peak-load runway pricing at Boston’s Logan airport was struck down by a federal court
as being unduly discriminatory, because the system imposed higher per-passenger costs on
small general aviation and commuter aircraft. Much of the opposition to runway pricing
has been led by general aviation and small commuter aircraft operators who use the same
airports and nearly as much scarce runway capacity as much larger commercial jets. Thus,
it is not unusual for a fully-loaded wide-bodied jet to be delayed in taking oﬀ by a small
plane carrying just four or fewer people. Though general aviation has been discouraged
at many highly-congested slot-controlled airports, the slot program legislation established
special categories to allocate rights to smaller commercial aircraft. The growth in corporate
and private jet usage only exacerbates this problem.
Market-based airport facilities allocations are not without problems. Economists
53studying the possibility of pricing solutions to airport congestion have pointed out two
potential concerns. First, a dominant airline at a slot-constrained airport could buy ex-
cess slots in order to deter entry. It is straightforward to show that a competitive en-
trant could be outbid by an incumbent that intended only to withhold the slot from use.
There have been some accusations of this behavior by small airlines attempting to enter a
slot-controlled airport, though these arguments have been undermined somewhat by the
accompanying claim that the small airline should receive the slots at no cost. Still, the
incentive of a ﬁrm with market power to restrict output is real and it turns out in practice
to be very diﬃcult to monitor for such behavior.82
A second concern is the complexity of determining eﬃcient congestion prices. Con-
ventional models of congestion pricing, such as highway congestion tolls, assume atomistic
users. In that case, each user imposes the same congestion externality on all other users,
and symmetric tolls can enforce eﬃcient use of the scarce resource. For airports, such an
assumption is clearly violated. Moreover, if airlines diﬀer in their scale of operations, they
will internalize the congestion externality of an additional ﬂight to diﬀerent degrees. Large
carriers (with many ﬂights) will internalize more of the externality; small carriers, less (see
Brueckner, 2002, and Fan, 2003). For instance, if one airline has 60% of the ﬂights at an
airport, it will recognize that adding another ﬂight at a peak time incrementally delays all
of its existing ﬂights. It will not fully internalize the congestion since 40% of the ﬂights
are operated by other airlines, but it will have more incentive to avoid further congest-
ing peak periods than does an airline with 1% of all ﬂights. This would argue for higher
congestion tolls on carriers with smaller airport shares, all else equal, and apart from any
market power concerns. If airlines also exercise diﬀerent degrees of market power, optimal
toll design becomes even more complex–it is possible that optimal tolls would be zero
or negative for large carriers with considerable market power. Designing such a system
would be diﬃcult; implementing it politically would likely be impossible. It seems crucial,
however, to measure the potential costs of an imperfect market-based system to the sta-
tus quo, not the ﬁrst-best system. Greater use of market incentives could almost surely
improve economic welfare relative to the current system, which is driven by a combination
of historical property rights, administrative rules of thumb, and political clout.
In addition to ineﬃcient access to scarce infrastructure resources, the current system
54provides no mechanism to tie investment in that infrastructure to scarcity signals. Airport
regulation typically limits fees and prices to levels that provide a fair return on historic
investment costs. This may restrict landing fees to levels too low to promote eﬃcient
scheduling of scarce capacity and preclude any price signals that might guide eﬃcient
investment in future capacity. At some airports, geography or neighborhood limits may
eﬀectively preclude expansion of capacity at any reasonable cost. At others, capacity
expansion may be feasible. Allocating scarce capacity through a price system and using
revenue collected through that system to ﬁnance investment, may better discriminate
between these two conditions.
Many of the market power concerns in congestion management of runways also arise
in airport facilities management. The local authorities that operate airport terminals face
the standard set of local development issues and ﬁnancing concerns. They lease space to
airlines and retail shops in order to ﬁnance operations. When they want to expand the
facility, incumbent airlines are often the primary purchasers of the local bonds sold to
ﬁnance the projects. In many cases, they have negotiated preferential access to terminal
space in exchange for ﬁnancing commitments. These may be necessary in order secure
ﬁnancing for airport facility expansions, but they can lead to ineﬃcient exclusion of new
competitors. The airport authority must balance ﬁnancial constraints against the longer-
run goal of attaining competitive air service that beneﬁts the surrounding community.
2. Infrastructure technology: A more diﬃcult area to analyze is that of technological
innovation in government-controlled infrastructure. Many industry participants have be-
moaned the technology lag in the country’s air traﬃc control system. The government has
admitted that the system is out-of-date and overburdened, but a plan to overhaul the sys-
tem and install modern technology for air traﬃc control has recently been abandoned after
an investment of more than $4 billion. Some critics argue that a private company would
not have made the same mistakes or delayed new technology adoption so long (see Haus-
man’s discussion of government impediments to technological innovation in the telecomm
sector in this volume). The airline industry is subject to a variety of government fees
and taxes. While some of these are earmarked for aviation investment, there has been no
direct link between the collections and infrastructure investment, and the government has
at times used the surplus in the Aviation Trust Fund to meet other budget goals. This has
55led some to call for privatization of the infrastructure system, with fees and taxes ﬂowing
to the privatized entity. A privatized monopoly air traﬃc control system, while perhaps
increasing eﬃciency relative to its objective function, would present a new set of concerns.
We suspect that regulatory issues similar to those presented by a private monopoly electric
grid operator, as discussed in Joskow’s chapter, would pose considerable challenges.
Conclusion
Airline regulators attempted to assure a stable, growing industry that beneﬁted con-
sumers and the economy. The result was relatively high fares, ineﬃcient operations, and
airline earnings volatility. The problems with economic regulation of airlines prompted a
pathbreaking shift in 1978, as the U.S. became the ﬁrst country to deregulate its domestic
airline industry. Fares have declined since deregulation and eﬃciency has improved, but
it is diﬃcult to know what counter-factual with which the current state of the industry
should be compared 30 years after deregulation. The volatility in industry earnings has
continued and average earnings have declined since deregulation.
Still, the continuing upheaval in the industry shows no signs of impeding the ﬂow of
investment in airlines or the beneﬁts to consumers. Though the attacks of September 11,
2001 resulted in a major setback to the ﬁnances of the industry (even after the $5 billion in
cash gifts the federal government bestowed upon the airlines in the following weeks), their
eﬀect on the level of air service was very short-lived. More domestic routes had nonstop
service in the summer of 2002 than in the summer of 2001 just prior to the attacks, and
the daily number of domestic ﬂights was nearly identical across the two years. Real fares
continued to decline into 2005 and remained low through 2007, though they may increase
through 2008 as high fuel costs triggered capacity reductions and price increases. By many
measures, the level of service was better in 2006 and 2007 than in any previous year. More
U.S. city-pairs were connected by nonstop service than at any time in history and there
were more commercial ﬂights.
The rebound and growth in service and traﬃc comes with a heavy price, however. As
passenger volume has expanded, and ﬂight operations have increased more than commen-
surately with the movement toward smaller aircraft and more frequent service in many
markets, congestion and delay costs have also reached record levels. Moreover, this prob-
56lem is far from unique to the U.S. Eﬀfectively managing aviation infrastructure—eﬃciently
allocating access to current resources, investing in technology and physical capacity im-
provements at airports and in the air traﬃc control system, and ensuring eﬃcient provision
of airport security—is likely to be one of the greatest challenges facing the global aviation
industry over the decades to come.
The average returns that the airlines have earned since deregulation are almost cer-
tainly insuﬃcient to sustain the industry in its current state, although this conclusion
would have been substantially diﬀerent in the late 1990s. Concluding that competition in
the industry is unsustainable, however, is premature. The natural volatility in the demand
for air travel will probably always cause earnings to be less stable than in other indus-
tries, but other factors that have depressed earnings are potentially controllable. Slow
adjustment of labor costs is an institutional feature of the industry that may change either
through new labor agreements at legacy carriers or through shift in market share to airlines
that can adjust more nimbly. Much of the instability since deregulation has resulted from
experimentation with ﬂight scheduling, pricing, loyalty programs, distribution systems,
and organization forms. Though clear, permanent answers to these management issues are
unlikely to emerge, one would expect some learning to result from the experimentation
and the range of strategies to narrow.
For most consumers, airline deregulation has been a beneﬁt. For many airlines, it has
been a costly experiment, though a few have prospered in the unregulated environment.
Both the companies and economists studying the industry continue to learn from the
industry dynamics.
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Figure 2: www.airchive.com, accessed 9/9/2007.
Figure 3: Air Transport Association of America, Inc.,
http://www.airlines.org/economics/ﬁnance/PaPricesYield.htm and
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Figure 4: Author calculations from DOT Databank 1A/1B. SIFL formula is available at
http://ostpxweb.dot.gov/aviation/domfares/siﬂ.htm
Figure 5: Author calculations from domestic tickets in Databank 1A/1B using only tickets
of 4-coupons or fewer. See (“Translation of Domestic DB1A into More Usable Form” at
http://home.comcast.net/ sborenstein/airdata.html). Drops all fares less than zero and
greater than four times SIFL for observed route. Drops all fares labeled ﬁrst-class except
for Southwest, Jet Blue, Spirit, Frontier, and ATA, which report all or nearly all seats as
ﬁrst-class during some quarters. For Cross-Route Dispersion, excludes fourth quarter of
1980 data because Eastern and Delta massively under-reported to the DOT 10% ticket
sample. Annual data are average of quarterly calculations, weighted by revenue passenger-
miles.
Figure 6: Author calculations from DOT Form 41, Schedule P6.
Figure 7: Author calculations from DOT Form 41, Schedule P6. Low-Cost Carriers deﬁned
as Air Tran, America West, ATA, Frontier, Jet Blue, Midway, People Express, PSA, Reno,
Southwest, Spirit, ValuJet. Share based on domestic revenue passenger-miles.
Figure 8: Jordan (2005) for events through 2003. Carrier entry and exit after 2003 updated
from BTS carrier list
http://www.bts.gov/programs/airline information/number of employees/certiﬁcated
carriers/index.html
68Bankruptcies after 2003 updated with information from Air Transport Association Eco-
nomics webpages,
http://www.airlines.org/economics/specialtopics/USAirlineBankruptcies.htm .
Figure 9: Author calculations from domestic tickets in Databank 1A/1B using only tickets
of 4-coupons or fewer. See (“Aggregation of Domestic DB1A into One Record per Carrier-
Route” at http://home.comcast.net/ sborenstein/airdata.html). The airports counted as
h u b sa r eO R D ,A T L ,D F W ,D E N ,S T L ,D T W ,M S P ,P I T ,I A H ,C L T ,S L C ,M E M .E x c l u d e s
fourth quarter of 1980 data (see ﬁgure 5 note). Annual data are average of quarterly
calculations, weighted by revenue passenger-miles.
Figure 10: Author calculations from domestic tickets in Databank 1A/1B using only tickets
of 4-coupons or fewer. See (“Translation of Domestic DB1A into More Usable Form”
at http://home.comcast.net/ sborenstein/airdata.html). Excludes fourth quarter of 1980
data (see ﬁgure 5 note). Change-of-plane (COP) share is total number of directinal trips (a
round-trip is two directional trips) that include a change of planes divided by all directional
trips. Adjusted Change-of-plane (ACOP) share is set equal to COP share for 1979. For
all successive years, ACOP share is the previous year ACOP plus the weighted average
change in COP share in all 50-mile distance categories, where the weight is the previous
year passengers in each 50-mile distance category.
Figure 11: Author calculations from DOT T-100 service segment dataset. An airport pair
is deﬁned as “served” if it averages at least one nonstop ﬂight and 10 seats perday during
the month. Note that there was a change in October 2002 to the T-100 that added a
number of small carriers (two-character codes of carriers added were 3C, 5C, 8C, 9E, 9J,
9K, 9L, BMJ, BSA, CHA, CMT, DH, ELL, EM, EWA, F8, FE, FI, FX, GBQ, GCH, GLA,
GLF, HNA, HRZ, JX, KAH, KR, MIW, NC, NEW, NWS, PAM, PFQ, RYQ, SEA, SHA,
S I ,S K W ,S L A ,S M O ,T C Q ,T R I ,U S Q ,V E E ,V I Q ,V P J ,W I ,W P ,W R D ,W S T ,Y T U ,
YV, ZV). These carriers are dropped in order to maintain comparability.
Figure 12: Air Transport Association of America, Inc. 2006 and authors’ calculations of
Net Income deﬂated by Urban CPI deﬂator, 2007=100.
http://www.airlines.org/economics/ﬁnance/Annual+US+Financial+Results.htm .
69Figure 13: Authors’ calculations based on domestic industry revenue passenger-miles and
average domestic yield (revenue per revenue passenger-mile) from Air Transport Associ-
ation of America, Inc. , http://www.airlines.org/economics (see Figures 1 and 3). Yield
deﬂated by Urban CPI deﬂator, 2007=100.
Figure 14: See Figure 13 and explanation in text.
Figure 15: Labor Cost is total domestic salaries and beneﬁts from DOT Form 41, Schedule
P6.
Figure 16: Fuel Cost is is total domestic aircraft fuel expense from DOT Form 41, Schedule
P6.
Figure 17: Air Transport Association of America, Inc. for RPM, ASM and load factor,
http://www.airlines.org/economics/traﬃc.
Figure 18: Data sources are listed in the simulation spreadsheet, available from the authors.
Figure 19: Tam and Hansman (2003), ﬁgures 4-12 and 4-13.
Figure 20: Author calculations from same source and inclusion criteria as ﬁgure 5. See
Borenstein (2005) for exact details of calculation.
70ENDNOTES
1 The 1938 legislation also provided for federal authority over airline and airport operations.
Ultimately, system operations, certiﬁcation, and safety regulation was concentrated in the
Federal Aviation Authority, leaving the CAB responsible for the economic (price and entry)
regulation that is the focus of this chapter.
2 For example, between the U.S. and Canada and the U.S. and the Netherlands. A U.S.-
EU-wide open skies agreement was negotiated following the European Commission’s nul-
liﬁcation of bilateral open skies agreements between the U.S. and individual EU member
countries, with a substantial liberalization taking eﬀect in March 2008. Disagreement over
U.S. limits on foreign ownership of domestic air carriers and denial of EU carrier rights to
cabotoge within the U.S. remain, however.
3 These data are now used to study aspects of ﬁrm behavior not directly related to regula-
tion, but of broad interest to industrial organization economists, ﬁrms, and policymakers.
See, for example, studies of entry determinants and incumbent responses (e.g. Berry, 1990
and 1992; Whinston and Collins, 1992) and price level and structure determinants (e.g.,
Borenstein, 1989; Hurdle et al., 1989; Borenstein and Rose, 1994; Morrison, 2001).
4 See Wolfram (2004) for an analysis of the performance of the early airmail contract award
process.
5 See the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 977 (1938), amended in 1958 by the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731, 49 U.S.C. §1341 (1958). In addition to
economic regulation, these acts extended government oversight to aircraft certiﬁcation,
safety regulation of airline operations, airport development, and the air traﬃc control
system. The safety functions were unaﬀected by changes in economic regulation, and are
therefore beyond the scope of the present analysis. We discuss infrastructure policy in
Section IV.
6 This section is not intended to duplicate the many excellent treatises on airline regulation.
See Caves (1962) and Levine (1965) for detailed discussions of the early airline industry and
its regulation in the U.S. These sources, along with Jordan (1970), Eads (1975), Douglas
71and Miller (1974a), Bailey, Graham, and Kaplan (1985), and many others, provide excellent
analyses of the regulated era.
7 49 U.S.C. §1302, 1371 (1958). The exchange of government coordination and regulation
for the “destructive competition” of the market was echoed in the origin of trucking reg-
ulation under the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, for example. See Kahn (1971), volume II,
chapter 5.
8 49 U.S.C. §1302 (1958).
9 A revenue passenger-mile is one paying passenger ﬂying one mile on a commercial ﬂight.
10 Caves, 1962, 20. This deﬁnes monopoly markets as a single carrier with 90% or greater
market share; duopoly as two carriers with a combined 90% or greater market share.
11 The CAB attempted various legal arguments to bring intrastate markets under its
jurisdiction, most creatively and successfully in the case of intra-Hawaiian markets.
12 The California Public Utilities Commission had oversight authority for intrastate airline
markets, but until mid-1965 could not regulate entry and exercised little control over fares.
See Levine (1965).
13 See Caves (1962) and Keeler (1972). Rose (1985, 1987) estimates rents for regulated
less-than-truckload motor carriers in the range of 15% of total revenues.
14 See Braniﬀ’s “Air Strip” advertising campaign built around its designer ﬂight attendant
uniforms, viewable on Mary Wells Lawrence’s “author’s desktop” at
http://www.randomhouse.com/knopf/authors/lawrence/desktop.html.
15 The Mutual Aid Pact established a system of strike insurance among participating
airlines. By 1970, amendments to the Pact elicited participation by all trunk airlines but
nonunion carrier Delta. The initial pact provided that “each party will pay over to the
party suﬀering the strike an amount equal to its increased revenue attributable to the strike
during the term thereof, less applicable direct expenses.” (Unterberger and Koziara, 1975,
27). Revisions over time speciﬁed guaranteed minimum payments at a speciﬁed fraction
72of the struck carrier’s “normal air operating expenses.” Unterberger and Koziara (1975)
argue that the terms made some airlines more proﬁtable during a strike than they were
under normal operations, increasing the number and duration of observed strikes.
16 Setting prices independent of an individual carrier’s cost would seem to yield high-
powered incentives for cost-minimization and technical eﬃciency by individual carriers
(Laﬀont and Tirole, 1993). This incentive was undermined, however, by the CAB’s implicit
policy of assigning proﬁtable new routes to struggling carriers and unproﬁtable new routes
to carriers that were highly proﬁtable.
17 Hundreds, if not thousands, of books and articles have been written on the politics and
economics of airline deregulation, with detail we cannot begin to replicate here. For a
brief introduction, see Breyer (1982), Bailey, Graham, and Kaplan (1985), Kahn (1988),
Borenstein (1992), Joskow and Noll (1994), Morrison and Winston (1995, 2000), and the
references cited therein.
18 Breyer (1982, ch. 16), who was instrumental in focusing Kennedy’s attention on airline
regulation, provides a superb history and analysis of these events, and argues for Kennedy’s
role as a catalyst for eventual reform.
19 See the discussion in Bailey (2008).
20 See http://ostpxweb.dot.gov/aviation/domfares/siﬂb.pdf.
21 The calculation reported here includes free travel tickets in the DB1A, most of which
are frequent ﬂyer bonus trips. Excluding all tickets with fares of $10 and below raises the
actual yields by about 4%. Dollar savings are scaled up from the ten percent sample in
the DB1A.
22 We arrive at this number by assuming constant quality and a constant elasticity demand
with long-run elasticity of -1.5, then calculating the diﬀerence in consumer surplus from
the actual 2005 average yield and domestic RPMs and the counterfactual SIFL price level
and associated quantity along the same demand curve.
7323 Morrison and Winston (1995, 12-14), performing a similar analysis of actual to SIFL
fares for 1976 through 1993, argue that deregulation increased productivity, and therefore
adjust the SIFL index upward by 1.2% per year over 1978 and 1983, and by a constant
8.7% thereafter, to remove estimated deregulation-related productivity gains.
24 This number comes from assuming that all costs are invariant to number of passengers
except 25% of labor costs, 50% of advertising costs, 100% of food costs and 100% of
passenger commissions, all of which are assumed to increase linearly in the number of
passengers.
25 An interesting and unknowable question is how a regulator would have handled the
airlines’ post-9/11 ﬁnancial crisis. Would, for instance, the airlines have been able to push
through regulated fare increases to compensate for weak demand even though the industry
had massive excess capacity?
26 Through most of the regulated era, fare structures typically consisted of a standard
coach and ﬁrst-class fare on each route with very limited exceptions, such as a youth or
family discount fare. A signiﬁcant deviation from this policy was the Board’s 1966 approval
of “Discover America” excursion fares for leisure markets and oﬀ-season transcontinental
ﬂights.
27 See the data appendix for a detailed description of the construction of this measure.
28 An available seat-mile is one seat ﬂown one mile on a commercial ﬂight.
29 The ﬁgure does not adjust for average ﬂight distance, which is inversely related to cost
per ASM. Adjusting for ﬂight distance expands the cost advantage of the low-cost carriers,
because most ﬂy shorter ﬂights than industry average.
30 Recent changes to these programs have greatly devalued the frequent ﬂyer points cur-
rency, increasing the miles needed to redeem award travel and reducing the number of
seats available for those awards. This strategy seems to have reduced the concerns some
analysts have voiced about the airlines’ liability represented by the billions of outstanding
points.
7431 The most obvious manifestation of agency problems were short-lived promotions in late
1988 and 1989, such as the Eastern shuttle promotion handing passengers $50 Ameri-
can Express gift cheques as they boarded, and Continental’s promotion giving a $50 bill
(distributed at the airport) to customers traveling on high-fare tickets.
32 Borenstein (1996) presents a model of repeat-buyer programs in network industries and
discusses their use in many industries throughout the twentieth century.
33 These restrictions were lifted in 2004 based on the argument that there are now many
more competing sources of fare, schedule and seat-availability information.
34 A common ﬁnding in many industries is that entry rates and exit rates are highly
temporally correlated; see Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1998).
35 Southwest Airlines and America West, which was renamed USAir after its purchase of
that rival.
36 Those three are AirTran, Frontier, and Midwest (Express) Airlines.
37 Survivors include ﬁve former trunk airlines, American, Continental, Delta, Northwest,
United; local service carrier USAir (though now owned by a new entrant); and former
Alaskan/Hawaiian carriers Alaska, Aloha and Hawaiian Airlines, but in March 2008, Aloha
Airlines ceased operations.
38 These are ORD, ATL, DFW, DEN, STL, DTW, MSP, PIT, IAH, CLT, SLC, and MEM.
39 Some decisions on organizational form were undoubtedly inﬂuenced by expected oper-
ational and labor costs associated with ownership of commuter carriers. See Forbes and
Lederman, 2006.
40 Frustrated by restrictions on entering international routes, major U.S. carriers began to
create “alliances” with foreign carriers that followed the same model as their partnerships
with commuter airlines.
41 Bamburger, Carlton and Neumann (2004) do not separately analyze these markets.
7542 We adjust for trip length by calculating the change in change-of-plane share in 100-mile
trip distance categories and then creating an overall change in change-of-plane share by
taking a weighted average of the change within each category.
43 There are some indications that consumer dissatisfaction with the ability of airlines to
recover from schedule disruptions during the summer of 2007 is leading some airlines to
conclude that they have now undercut even the minimum service quality passengers are
willing to pay for. See McCartney, 2007.
44 The overall denied boarding rate has varied within a narrow band of 0.15% to 0.22%
since 1990; voluntary denied boardings account for 90% to 95% of these. See the U. S. De-
partment of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, National Transportation
Statistics 2003, Table 1-58, at http://www.bts.gov/publications/national transportation
statistics/html/table 01 58.html .
45 Denied boarding compensation is not mandated if the oversale is due to substitution of
smaller aircraft than originally scheduled, the passenger has not complied with check-in
requirements, or the delay is less than one hour.
46 See the discussion of LaGuardia airport’s 2000 experience in section IV and in Forbes
(2004).
47 Most airline accidents have modest impacts on the aﬀected ﬁrm’s capital market value
and little or no measurable impact on subsequent demand; see Borenstein and Zimmerman,
1988. As Borenstein and Zimmerman point out, this may be “due to very limited updating
of prior beliefs [about an airline’s safety] or to a low marginal valuation of safety” (1988
at 933) at current levels of safety provision. Dillon, Johnson, and Pate-Cornell, 1999,
argue that some accidents may contain more information and therefore generate greater
responses, such as ValuJet’s loss of one-quarter of its market value in the month following
its 1996 Everglades crash and its subsequent decision to rebrand as AirTran following its
acquisition of that ﬁrm in 1997.
48 The focus on national “ﬂag carriers” persists today, although private investors have
replaced state ownership in most countries. Most jurisdictions, including the United States,
76limit foreign national ownership of airlines. Only a handful of countries—Australia, Chile,
and New Zealand—have eliminated foreign ownership restrictions for domestic airlines. For
airlines within the EU, nationality limits have been replaced by a 49% limit on foreign
ownership applying only to owners outside the EU. The U.S. statutory limit of 25% of
voting shares in foreign ownership is now one of the most severe, and its enforcement
has been aggressive. See, for example, the adjudication of Virgin America’s request for
certiﬁcation beginning in 2006. This has been a particular source of disagreement in
negotiations over international routes between the U.S. and countries in the EU.
49 See Doganis, 2006, and Odoni, 2006, for a more complete description of the Convention
and its Freedoms.
50 Revenue-sharing agreements were not permitted in U.S. bilaterals, as they were viewed as
a violation of U.S. antitrust policy. In addition, the CAB, on behalf of the U.S. government,
frequently protested fares set by IATA as too high.
51 A few multilateral agreements eventually opened common aviation areas to competitive
service, such as the Asia Paciﬁc Economic Community agreement between the U.S., Brunei,
Singapore, Chile, Peru, and New Zealand.
52 Congress has articulated national security, operational, safety, and labor concerns over
foreign national ownership of U.S. carriers. While most of these concerns could be ad-
dressed through less restrictive means (see the discussion of the Brattle Report on these
issues in Doganis, 2006, chapter 3), the political environment in the U.S. seems resistant
to signiﬁcant change.
53 See, for example, the lobbying by U.S. carriers over the availability of new U.S.-China
routes (Torbenson, 2007).
54 In undiscounted cumulative current dollars of accounting net income. A true, but
perhaps not terribly meaningful statement.
55 For a discussion of the general theory of sustainability, see Baumol, Panzar, and Willig
(1982).
7756 See, e.g., Caves, Christensen, and Tretheway 1984, Ng and Seabright 2001, and Basso
and Jara-Diaz 2005. Brueckner and Spiller 1994 estimate substantially larger returns to
density, with an elasticity of marginal cost with respect to spoke density out of hub airports
of -0.3 to -0.4 from their structural model of demand and proﬁt-maximization.
57 The proﬁt information we discuss here covers only domestic operations. U.S. carriers are
required to report separate ﬁnancial statements for domestic and international operations,
though obviously all of the typical transfer pricing and revenue sharing issues arise in such
ﬁnancial breakouts.
58 Many other factors may have changed over this period–most notably, demand elasticity
–so the graph should not be read as literally measuring exogenous demand shifts.
59 Gillen, Morrison, and Stewart (2004) survey estimates of air travel demand elasticities.
60 As a point of comparison, we carried out similar exercises with gasoline, coal and
electricity demand using elasticity estimates from published demand studies. Over 1961-
2005, the standard deviation of the growth rate of airline demand was 6.6%. For gasoline,
coal and electricity, the standard deviations of demand growth rates were 2.2%, 3.2%, and
2.8%, respectively. We also examined the serial correlation in demand changes, which was
0.21 for air travel demand changes over this period, while it was 0.57 for gasoline, 0.12
for coal, and 0.58 for electricity. This suggests that the demand growth for gasoline and
electricity changes much less sharply than demand for air travel or coal.
61 In a notable exception, Northwest Airlines trained 1900 replacement workers in antici-
pation of an August 2005 mechanics strike. The strike failed and many of the mechanics
were permanently replaced by workers receiving substantially lower wages.
62 See Hirsch (2006) for an analysis along these lines.
63 Other than capital, labor and fuel expenses, the largest airline cost category is service
(including commissions, advertising, insurance, non-aircraft equipment rental) which aver-
aged 19% over this period, while the remaining costs include maintenance materials, food,
landing fees, and other.
7864 On a fully loaded commercial jet, passengers and their baggage comprise about 15% of
the takeoﬀ weight of the aircraft.
65 This can arise from an empirical S-curve distribution of passenger share as a function
of ﬂight share on a route, discussed earlier.
66 More precisely, load factor is revenue passenger-miles divided by available seat-miles.
67 Over this time, until 2005, the real price of jet fuel has declined fairly steadily, which
by itself might suggest a decline in equilibrium load factors.
68 The model is implemented in a spreadsheet that is available from the authors.
69 Former hub airports include those in Nashville, Raleigh-Durham, Kansas City and
Columbus, OH. Some airlines even considered opening “pure hubs, ” airports located in
remote areas in the middle of the country with no local demand, used just for passengers
to change planes, but the idea was never pursued.
70 Though Southwest does not schedule operations in a traditional hub model, it today
operates small scale hubs at Dallas Love Field, Chicago Midway, Salt Lake City, Phoenix,
Las Vegas and Baltimore, and 15% of its passengers traveled on connecting itineraries in
2007.
71 For example, the costly price war that erupted after American Airlines’ 1992 introduction
of its “simpliﬁed” Value Pricing plan illustrates the intense divergence of preferred price
structures across airlines.
72 See Trottman, 2001, and Zuckerman, 2001, on the decline in unrestricted ticket sales.
73 Southwest is frequently at or near the top in on-time performance among the major
carriers and Jet Blue, until its Valentine’s Day 2007 winter storm meltdown, had main-
tained a policy against discretionary cancellations on the theory that passengers preferred
late arrivals to non-arrivals.
74 Though alliances have become a mainstay of operations among most of the large carriers,
79Southwest and the other low-cost airlines generally have not pursued them. Southwest’s
only alliance or joint-marketing agreement was with ATA, which ceased operation in April
2008.
75 See Bailey and Panzar (1981) and Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982).
76 See Borenstein (1989, 1990, 1991, and 1992) and Hurdle et al. (1989), Abramowitz and
Brown (1993).
77 Some studies suggest a greater eﬀect when the potential competitor is Southwest Air-
lines; see Morrison (2001).
78 See Borenstein (1989, 1991, and 1996) and Lederman (2007, 2008).
79 The exact method of airport premium calculation is presented in Borenstein (2005).
80 A signiﬁcant contribution to delay in 2000 was a surge in delays at a single airport–
LaGuardia–resulting from AIR21 legislation that overruled the FAA’s High Density Rule
constraints.
81 Note, for example, the growth in private toll-roads in California, and positive responses
to London’s congestion tolls on automobiles driving within the center city.
82 A “use it or lose it” rule imposed at slot-constrained airports required that each slot be
used on 80% of all days. In practice, this means that a ﬁrm could restrict output by 20%
without being in violation of the rule, because they own many slots for each hour and can
“assign” a given takeoﬀ or landing to a diﬀerent slot on diﬀerent days.
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Figure 2:  Sample Regulated Era Route Map:   







































































































































































































































































































Legacy Jet Blue Frontier Air Tran America West Midway
























































































































































































































































































Real Operating Income per RPM





















































































































































































































































































































































































































Simulated Profit Actual Operating Profit Low-Volatility Case       
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